Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 10/19/23 Zak Goldstein 10/19/23

PA Superior Court: Prison Sentence Okay For Adult Charged With Crimes Committed Decade Ago When Juvenile

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Torres, upholding the defendant’s convictions and lengthy prison sentence for rape of a child and related charges even though the defendant committed the crimes while he was a juvenile himself. In this case, the Superior Court approved of a long jail sentence for a defendant who committed serious sex crimes when he was a juvenile but was not arrested and charged until years later when he was an adult.

Had the defendant been prosecuted when the crimes happened, he would have been prosecuted in family court and likely received a year or two in a treatment facility. But because he was not prosecuted until a decade later, he was charged an adult, and he received a sentence of 19 - 40 years’ incarceration. This is obviously an absurd result, and the defendant will hopefully appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The Facts of Torres

Between June 2008 and March 2011, Torres lived with his mother, four of his younger half-siblings, and his maternal grandmother in Lancaster Township. During that period, he sexually abused three of his half-siblings; his half-sister and two half-brothers. At the time of the offense, the three children were between the ages of two-and-a-half and six years old, and Torres was between the ages of 13 to 15. He was often left in charge of his younger half siblings because their mother was working sixteen hour days to support their family.

The half-sister reported that Torres would make her go to his bedroom and digitally penetrate her vagina, force her to perform oral sex on him, force her to swallow his ejaculate, and force her to have sex with him. In May 2009, she told her mother, and her mother called the police. The half-sister was interviewed by Lancaster County Children’s Alliance, but she did not tell the interviewer about the abuse. The other half-siblings were not interviewed at the time, and no charges were filed.

Almost nine years later, in March 2018, the half-sister told her parents again that Torres sexually abused her in the past. After this report, Torres’ two younger half-brothers disclosed the abuse they suffered at the hands of Torres. The details are not necessary for reviewing the legal issues, but the abuse was unquestionably horrific.

Although Torres committed these crimes as a juvenile, the Commonwealth filed the charges in 2018 when Torres was 23 years old. Accordingly, prosecutors charged Torres as an adult instead of as a juvenile.

Procedural History

After the prosecution filed charges, Torres filed a motion to dismiss. He claimed that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith by failing to investigate the half-sister’s report and failing to interview the other children in 2009, which led to the adult charges instead of family court charges. He argued that he could not be charged in adult criminal court with offenses he committed as a juvenile and that he should be prosecuted in Family Court under the Juvenile Act. The trial court denied Torres’s motion in November 2020.

A jury convicted Torres of all the sexual offenses after a three-day trial that began on August 23, 2021. The probation department conducted a pre-sentence investigation. Torres appeared for sentencing in 2022, and the trial court sentenced Torres to 19 to 40 years’ incarceration even though he had committed these crimes as a juvenile.

Torres filed a post-sentence motion arguing that the “adult-based sentence” violated his constitutional rights given that the crimes were committed when he was a juvenile and the sentence would have focused on treatment and rehabilitation if he had been charged closer in time to when they occurred. The trial court denied the post-sentence motion, and he appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

On appeal, Torres first asserted that the trial court violated his due process rights when it denied his motion to dismiss, arguing the nine-year gap between the police report and the filing of charges prejudiced him because he lost the ability to have the charges handled in juvenile court. Next, Torres claimed the adult-based punishment of 19-40 years in prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment because Torres was between the ages of 13 and 15 years old when the crimes were committed. Lastly, Torres claimed the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to an aggregate period of 19-40 years’ incarceration.

The Superior Court denied all of Torres’s claims.

In denying Torres’s first claim, the Superior Court based its decision on precedent set in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent 2023 decision in Commonwealth v. Armolt. There, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a 42-year-old-male who committed offenses when he was a juvenile should be tried in juvenile court because the Commonwealth’s bad faith in delaying the charges caused him to lose the benefits of juvenile court. The Supreme Court explained that no bad faith existed because, for the purposes of the Juvenile Act, a “child” is defined as someone under the age of 18 or someone under the age of 21 who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years. The Supreme Court found that the Juvenile Act only extends juvenile jurisdiction to those who committed an offense while under the age of 18 if they are prosecuted before they turn 21.

The Superior Court applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning to Torres’s case because he was between 13 and 15 when the offense occurred but 23 when charged, so the Juvenile Act did not apply to him. Because the Juvenile Act did not apply, the Superior Court approved of the trial court’s denial of Torres’s motion to dismiss appropriate.

The Superior Court also rejected his challenge to the sentence. The Superior Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not require strict proportionality between the crime committed and the sentence imposed. Instead, the Eighth Amendment forbids extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. The Superior Court opined that most cases where cruel and unusual punishment has been found involved life sentences for juveniles tried as adults. The Court instead explained that Torres was sentenced to 19-40 years in prison and not a life sentence, making those cases inapplicable. Further, the Court decided that because the Juvenile Act did not apply, Torres was not entitled to any special sentencing benefits.

Finally, the Superior Court decided the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a long sentence. The Superior Court noted a sentencing judge has broad discretion because that judge is in the best position to “view the defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime”. The Superior Court further explained that the sentencing court considers the crime’s effect on the victims and community as a whole along with the defendant’s prior record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for rehabilitation. Finally, the Court explained that when a trial court has the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report, its discretion should not usually be disturbed. Here, the sentencing judge had a pre-sentence investigation and conducted a full hearing. At Torres’s sentencing hearing, the trial court provided a full history of Torres’s life, paying close attention to his upbringing including, the sexual, physical, and emotional abuses Torres himself endured as a child. The Superior Court confirmed that the trial court considered all the proper sentencing factors and found the sentence appropriate, ultimately upholding the sentence.

The decision in Torres clearly illustrates just how much leeway and discretion the prosecution and trial courts have when it comes to criminal cases. Had the Commonwealth prosecuted Torres as a juvenile when the allegations first came to light, while he was under the age of 18, he certainly would have avoided an aggregate 19–40-year sentence and would likely not be under any court supervision at this time. The case also shows the enormous difference between being charged as a juvenile and being charged ten years later as an adult. When charged as a juvenile, the consequences are likely to focus on treatment. But when charged for something old as an adult, even if the defendant has stayed out of trouble for a decade or more, the defendant could face decades in prison. The system is clearly in need of major reform.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 9/26/23 Zak Goldstein 9/26/23

Not Guilty: Attorney Goldstein Obtains Full Acquittal in Rape Case

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently obtained a full acquittal in a rape case. In Commonwealth v. P.S., the defendant was charged in Philadelphia with rape of a child and related charges for allegedly assaulting his biological daughter. According to the complainant, the assaults began when she was between the ages of 3 - 5 and continued until she was about 13 or 14. She did not report them until she was around 16, but prosecutors arrested P.S. and charged him with a number of sex crimes.

P.S. retained Attorney Goldstein to defend against the allegations. Attorney Goldstein investigated the case, obtained discovery from the District Attorney’s Office, and learned that the complainant’s mother, from whom the client had separated shortly before the allegations were first made in Family Court, had been claiming that P.S. assaulted the complainant for years. Attorney Goldstein investigated further and obtained family court transcripts which showed that the complainant had told judges that the assaults did not actually happen and that there was a lengthy history of litigation over child custody and child support. The family court records showed that the complainant’s mother had made these unfounded allegations supposedly on behalf of her daughter anytime she wanted to deny P.S. from having custody, but she had continued to let him see her and had never gone to the police. This behavior obviously did not make sense if the mother believed that child abuse was actually occurring.

P.S. proceeded to trial before a judge in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The complainant testified that P.S. assaulted her, but her testimony differed wildly from what she had told social workers in a videotaped interview which took place at the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance. Through cross-examination, Attorney Goldstein was able to show that P.S.’s story had changed repeatedly, she had previously told a judge that the assaults did not actually happen, all of her medical exams had been totally normal, and her mom had been telling her that her father had molested her since she was about three years old. Finally, when the complainant’s mother testified, it quickly became clear that she had fabricated the allegations by insisting that these horrible things happened only after she began suing P.S. for child custody and child support.

The trial judge promptly acquitted P.S. at the end of the one day waiver trial. The judge found that the allegations were fabricated and that the complainant’s mother had essentially traumatized her daughter and put her up to making the allegations. Instead of facing decades in prison and a lifetime of Megan’s Law registration, P.S. has now been found not guilty and will be eligible to have the charges expunged.

Allegations of child abuse and child sexual assault are among the most serious possible charges and the most difficult to defend. Judges and juries often have a difficult time believing that children could lie about something so horrible. Fortunately, our attorneys are experienced in investigating these cases and cross-examining the complainants and witnesses in order to effectively fight back against false charges. We have won many of these cases at preliminary hearings, at trial, on appeal, and in PCRA litigation.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 8/10/23 Zak Goldstein 8/10/23

PA Superior Court: Suppression Required if Police Don’t Knock and Announce

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Goodis, holding that the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to suppress because the evidence overwhelmingly showed that the police failed to “knock and announce” prior to entering the defendant’s house to execute a search warrant. The consequences to the government of a failure to knock and announce are very different in Pennsylvania and federal courts. In federal court, a knock and announce violation does not lead to suppression. But in Pennsylvania state court, a violation of the knock and announce rule requires that the trial court suppress the evidence.

The Facts of Goodis

In Goodis, the defendant had been convicted of various counts relating to the possession and distribution of child pornography in state court. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that police failed to knock and announce before entering his house to execute a search warrant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the police acted too quickly but were justified in relying on concerns of officer safety. The defendant appealed.

What is the knock and announce rule?

The knock and announce rule requires police to knock on the door, wait a little bit, and announce their identity, purpose, and authority before entering. Generally, this is accomplished by the police knocking, yelling something along the lines of “police, open up, search warrant,” and then giving the occupant of the building a little bit of time to respond. If the police obtain a no-knock warrant or hear something that suggests the person inside is attempting to flee, grab a weapon, or destroy evidence, then police may dispense with the knock and announce requirement. They also generally do not have to wait very long. But they do have to knock, announce, and give the occupant of the building some time to open the door before they break in.

It is notable that the appellate court may have had some doubts about the defendant’s actual guilt. Even after the trial court denied the motion to suppress, the defense was able to show at trial that police had damaged the hard drive which allegedly contained the child pornography, and he called expert witnesses who testified that the contraband could have been placed there by someone accessing his wireless network which was unsecured at the time. The police also did not find a large quantity of contraband images and videos. In many cases, they find thousands of images and videos. In this case, they only found a few.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial judge’s ruling on the motion to suppress. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 207 and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution require that police, before entering a dwelling to execute a search warrant, announce their identity, purpose and authority and give the occupant a reasonable period of time after such announcement to let them in, unless exigent circumstances require immediate forcible entry. The purposes of this requirement, known as the “knock and announce rule,” are to prevent resistance by an occupant protecting his dwelling, to prevent violence and physical injury to the police and occupants, to protect an occupant’s privacy expectation against the unauthorized entry, and to prevent property damage resulting from forced entry. The knock and announce rule is not limited to entry that involves breaking down a door or damage to the dwelling; it applies to any entry into a dwelling without the occupant’s permission, including entry through an unlocked door. Moreover, even where police knock and clearly announce their identity as police, failure to announce their purpose before entering the premises violates Rule 207 and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and suppression is required unless exigent circumstances for the failure to announce are shown.

The Commonwealth must prove compliance with the rule or that one of four exceptions applied. The exceptions are: 1) that the occupants fail to respond after repeated knocking and announcing; 2) that the police are virtually certain that the occupants already know their purpose; 3) that the police have reason to believe that an announcement prior to entry would imperil their safety; or 4) that the police have reason to believe that evidence is about to be destroyed.

Here, the trial court had found that the police announced their presence but did not announce their purpose or wait for a long enough time for the defendant to let them in the house. The court ruled, however, that the police acted with exigent circumstances because they believed that the defendant could have posed a threat to officer safety. On appeal, the defendant argued that this officer safety exception should not have applied.

The Superior Court reviewed the transcripts from the hearing as well as the body camera videos which were introduced by the parties. The videos showed that the police knocked, the defendant walked to the window and put up a finger, signaling that they should wait a second, and then he went out of view to get dressed. Before he got dressed, the police knocked the door down and then held him at gunpoint. The Commonwealth had argued that he could have been trying to destroy evidence or grab a weapon when he went out of view, but the Superior Court rejected this argument. The Court concluded that there was no reason to believe the defendant posed a threat to officer safety where the police were investigating a serious but non-violent crime, the defendant came to the door, signaled to the police for them to give him a second, and then the defendant appeared to be getting dressed. This is particularly true given that the police had not told him to come back or open the door immediately. Indeed, they did not announce their purpose at all. The defendant even appeared to say “hold on a second,” and one of the officers responded, “OK, all right.” As the officer agreed, the defendant had no reason not to believe it was okay for him to get dressed before opening the door. Thus, the officers did not have any objective reason to believe that there was an issue of officer safety that would eliminate the requirement of announcing their purpose.

The Superior Court therefore ordered that the evidence should be suppressed. The defendant will receive a new trial, and the Commonwealth will likely be unable to proceed.

The case shows the importance of carefully reviewing body cam footage before trial and understanding the differences between state and federal court. Without the body cam footage, the defendant would have had a very hard time convincing a panel of appellate judges that the police did not have legitimate officer safety concerns. He would have been left only with their testimony and limited ways in which to contradict it. Further, in federal court, the remedy for a knock and announce violation is not suppression. Instead, a defendant can sue the police, which does not do them much good while they are in prison serving a sentence for distribution of child pornography.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC - Criminal Defense Attorneys in Philadelphia

Zak Goldstein 7/25/23 Zak Goldstein 7/25/23

PA Superior Court: Adult Conviction May Require SORNA Registration for Some Offenses Committed as Juvenile

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Asbury, holding that a sentence including lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as a Sexually Violent Predator(SVP) may be imposed on a defendant convicted as an adult for acts committed as a juvenile. This holding also applies to individuals charged as adults for crimes they committed as juveniles. This means that an individual could commit a crime qualified as a non-delinquent act while under the age of eighteen and not be tried or convicted of that act until they are 35 and still be required, under SORNA, to register as a sex offender for the remainder of their life. In most cases, SORNA registration does not apply to offenses committed as a juvenile, but as Asbury shows, there are some exceptions to that general rule.

The Facts of Asbury

The defendant was sixteen years old when he committed two counts of rape by forcible compulsion. The first count involved the use of a firearm to aid in the commission of the offense, and the second count involved physically overpowering the victim with no weapon used. The first count is not considered a delinquent act under the Juvenile Act codified under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 because the defendant was over the age of fifteen at the time of the rape and it involved the use of a deadly weapon. Instead, Pennsylvania law provides that this conduct is only a crime rather than a delinquent act. Part of the guilty plea that was agreed upon by both parties was that the defendant was to have the court determine whether he was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The determination whether the defendant should register as a sex offender was only for the first count as that count involved a handgun. The second count, which did not involve a deadly weapon, would not trigger sex offender registration because the defendant committed the crime as a juvenile.

The court also ordered the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) to conduct an assessment of the defendant to determine if he met the criteria for classification as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Pennsylvania law. The SOAB ultimately concluded that the defendant should be classified as an SVP, and the trial court agreed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced the defendant to 60 to 120 months’ incarceration as well as lifetime sex offender registration. The defendant appealed.

The Superior Court’s Decision

On appeal, the defendant argued that he should not have to register as a sex offender pursuant to SORNA because he had committed the crimes as a juvenile. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously ruled in the case of In re J.B. that juvenile offenders have a protected right to reputation which is encroached on by SORNA’s presumption of recidivism, the presumption is not universally true, and there are alternative means for ascertaining the likelihood of reoffending. Therefore, requiring juveniles to register based solely on the offense of adjudication violates the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court also held that the application of SORNA’s current lifetime registration requirement upon adjudication of specified offenses violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing an irrebuttable presumption. Following J.B., the Superior Court ruled in Commonwealth v. Haines that the PA Supreme Court’s holding should apply with equal weight to a defendant convicted as an adult for crimes committed as a juvenile.

In this case, however, the Superior Court affirmed the sentenced registration requirements. The court rejected the defendant’s argument based on J.B. and Haines that the lifetime reporting requirements, for acts committed as a juvenile, under SORNA violated his due process rights by “utilizing an irrebuttable presumption” of a high likelihood of recidivism, even though that presumption is not “universally true.” The court accepted the Commonwealth’s argument that while it is unconstitutional to require lifetime SORNA reporting for “delinquent acts” committed by a juvenile even if later convicted and sentenced as an adult, the specific crime the defendant committed which led to his SVP classification did not qualify as a “delinquent act” under the Juvenile Act. The Court based its decision on the rationale that the Pennsylvania State Legislature specifically excluded certain crimes committed by juveniles from classification as “delinquent acts” because there are crimes that are so heinous that they require individuals to be tried as adults. The Court further reasoned that SVP classification is not a punitive measure designed to punish defendants; instead, it is a safety measure designed and applied to protect the community at large.

The Impact of Asbury

The Court’s ruling highlights the importance of the specific statutory language in Pennsylvania’s laws. In many cases, criminal charges are not brought until long after the acts have been committed, and sometimes convictions occur for adults who committed these crimes as juveniles. Just because an act is committed by a juvenile does not mean the act qualifies as a “delinquent act,” affording the individual certain protections that they would have had had they been charged sooner. Certain crimes committed by juveniles are always essentially adult crimes and may result in adult consequences.

At the same time, most sex offenses committed as a juvenile for which someone can be prosecuted as an adult do not trigger SORNA registration under Haines. In order for a court to impose a registration requirement on an adult who has been prosecuted for an offense they committed as a juvenile, either 1) the offense must have been committed with a deadly weapon, 2) the defendant must have had a prior serious sex offense, or 3) the court must find the defendant to be a sexually violent predator. Otherwise, the defendant should not have to register.