Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 1/15/26 Zak Goldstein 1/15/26

US Supreme Court Clarifies Standard for Warrantless Home Entries During Emergencies: Reasonable Basis, Not Probable Cause, is Required

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Supreme Court of the United States has issued a unanimous decision in Case v. Montana, settling a disagreement among lower courts about when police may enter a private home without a warrant to provide emergency assistance.

In an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court held that police do not need probable cause to enter a home to render emergency aid. Instead, officers only need an “objectively reasonable basis” for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened by such injury. This ruling reinforces the standard previously set in Brigham City v. Stuart and rejects the argument that the arguably higher “probable cause” standard used in criminal investigations should apply to emergency aid situations.

The Facts of the Case

The case arose from a domestic disturbance in Montana. The petitioner, William Case, allegedly called his ex-girlfriend and threatened to kill himself. During the call, she heard what sounded like a gun cocking, followed by a “pop” and then silence. She immediately called 911 and drove to his home.

The police drove to the home, as well. When police officers arrived, they knocked on the doors and yelled into an open window but received no response. Peering inside with flashlights, they saw an empty handgun holster and a notepad that appeared to contain a suicide note. Concerned that Case might have shot himself and was bleeding out, the officers decided to enter the home without a warrant to render emergency aid.

Upon entering a bedroom, Case emerged from a closet holding an object that looked like a gun. An officer, fearing for his safety, shot and injured Case. Case survived and was subsequently charged with assaulting a police officer. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the entry, arguing that the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The Legal Issue on Appeal: Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Basis

The Fourth Amendment generally protects the home from warrantless searches and seizures. However, there are exceptions, including the “emergency aid” exception.

The legal dispute in Case v. Montana centered on the standard of proof required for this exception. Case argued that because the home is constitutionally protected, officers should be required to have probable cause to believe an emergency exists. Probably cause is the same standard used for criminal warrants.

The Montana Supreme Court had upheld the entry but used a “community caretaker” doctrine that resembled a lower “reasonable suspicion” standard often used for street stops and car searches such as Terry frisks. The defendant appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, asking the Justices to impose the stricter probable cause requirement.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the application of the probable cause standard to emergency aid cases. Justice Kagan explained that the concept of “probable cause” is “peculiarly related to criminal investigations” and assesses the likelihood of finding evidence of a crime.

The Court held that transplanting criminal law standards into a non-investigatory, lifesaving context makes little sense. Instead, the Court reaffirmed the rule from Brigham City v. Stuart: officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened.

Applying this standard to the facts, the Court found the officers’ entry was lawful. The combination of the specific suicide threat, the “pop” heard over the phone, and the visual observation of the empty holster and suicide note gave officers a reasonable basis to believe Case needed immediate medical attention.

Key Takeaways

This decision provides clarity for both law enforcement and defense attorneys regarding the “emergency aid” exception:

Distinct from Criminal Investigation: The Court firmly separated emergency aid entries from criminal investigations. The higher “probable cause” standard does not apply when the primary purpose is saving lives, not gathering evidence.
Limited Scope of Entry: Importantly, the Court noted that this exception is not an open invitation to search. An emergency aid entry “provides no basis to search the premises beyond what is reasonably needed to deal with the emergency.” If police enter to check on a suicidal person, they cannot start rummaging through drawers for drugs unless those drawers are relevant to the emergency.
Community Caretaking Clarified: The Court criticized the lower court's reliance on the “community caretaker” doctrine, reiterating that broad community caretaking duties do not justify warrantless home entries on their own; there must be an actual exigency or emergency.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 1/14/26 Zak Goldstein 1/14/26

En Banc Pennsylvania Superior Court Clarifies That Probation May Run Concurrently with Incarceration

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has issued a significant en banc decision in the case of Commonwealth v. Jennings, resolving a recent conflict in Pennsylvania sentencing law. Overruling several recent panel decisions, the Court held that trial judges are in fact permitted to sentence defendants to terms of probation that run concurrently with terms of incarceration, including state prison sentences.

This decision restores the sentencing flexibility that defense attorneys and judges have long utilized and clarifies the plain language of the Sentencing Code.

The Facts of the Case

In Commonwealth v. Jennings, the defendant was convicted of attempted statutory sexual assault, unlawful contact with a minor, and related offenses after engaging in sexually explicit conversations with an undercover detective posing as a 14-year-old girl.

Due to prior convictions for rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) from 1989, the defendant faced mandatory minimum sentencing provisions which required the judge to impose a sentence of at least 25 to 50 years in prison. The trial court went well above that and ultimately sentenced him to an aggregate term of 50 to 100 years of incarceration. Relevant to this appeal, for the charge of criminal use of a communication facility (CUCF), the judge imposed a seven-year term of probation to run concurrently with the state prison sentence.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence was illegal. He relied on recent Superior Court decisions which had suggested that probation cannot be served while a defendant is incarcerated because probation is, by definition, a "less restrictive" alternative to jail meant for rehabilitation in the community and that it is not even possible to comply with the conditions of probation while in custody. For example, an inmate in a state prison cannot remain in the county of conviction or report to the county probation officer.

The Legal Issue: Can Probation and Prison Run Together?

The primary issue before the en banc panel was whether a sentencing court has the authority to order a term of probation to be served at the same time as a term of total confinement.

This question arose because of a string of recent unpublished panel opinions (such as Commonwealth v. Qawiee, Commonwealth v. Patel, and Commonwealth v. Bowers) which had vacated such sentences as illegal. Those panels reasoned that under cases like Commonwealth v. Allshouse and Commonwealth v. Basinger, probation was incompatible with incarceration.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court rejected the reasoning of those recent panels and affirmed the legality of concurrent probation. The Court based its decision on the plain text of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a), which outlines the sentencing alternatives available to a judge (such as probation, guilt without penalty, partial confinement, total confinement, and fines). The statute explicitly states that the court “may impose them consecutively or concurrently.”

The Court held:

Therefore, by its plain language, Section 9721(a) permits trial courts to impose concurrent terms of probation and total confinement. . . . To the extent that [prior cases] suggest that the Sentencing Code provides no authority for imposing probation concurrently with a term of total confinement, we disapprove of their rationales.

The Court explained that concurrent probation still serves a purpose. Even while incarcerated, a concurrent probationary tail can serve as a deterrent. If the defendant commits a new crime or misconduct in prison, that probation could theoretically be revoked. More importantly, the Court emphasized that statutory text supersedes policy arguments about whether concurrent supervision is “practical.” In other words, the policy justifications only come into play for an ambiguous statute, and here, the Court concluded that the statute was not ambiguous. A trial court may impose consecutive or concurrent probationary and prison sentence.

Secondary Issue: Notice for Mandatory Minimums

The defendant also challenged his mandatory minimum sentence on the grounds that the Commonwealth failed to include the triggering facts (his prior convictions) in the criminal information, which is the formal charging document in Pennsylvania.

The Superior Court rejected this argument, as well. Relying on Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent in Commonwealth v. Aponte, the Court held that prior convictions are a “sentencing factor,” not an element of the crime. Therefore, the Commonwealth is not required to list them in the criminal information. Providing reasonable notice of the intention to seek the mandatory minimum after conviction but before sentencing is sufficient to satisfy due process, although once a defendant has been convicted, it is too late for them to do anything about a mandatory minimum. A rule that requires notice prior to trial would be far better, but the appellate courts have not required that kind of notice.

Key Takeaways for Criminal Defendants

This decision is legally significant for several reasons:

Sentencing Flexibility: Judges often use concurrent probation as a way to close out a less serious count without adding a “tail” that keeps a defendant under state supervision for decades after their release. Jennings confirms this practice is legal.
Structuring Pleas: Defense attorneys can once again confidently negotiate plea deals that involve concurrent probation without fear that an appellate court will sua sponte vacate the sentence as illegal. Agreeing to a lengthy probationary sentence may in some cases result in less jail time for the defendant.
Mandatory Minimums: Unfortunately, the case serves as a reminder that the Commonwealth does not need to show its hand regarding mandatory minimums in the initial charging documents, provided they give notice before sentencing.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 1/11/26 Zak Goldstein 1/11/26

Pennsylvania Superior Court Upholds ATV Conviction Despite Out-of-State Registration

In a recent decision addressing the limits of out-of-state vehicle registration (Commonwealth v. Devilbiss), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a summary conviction against a defendant who argued that his Montana registration permitted him to operate an ATV on Pennsylvania roadways.

The case serves as an important reminder that registration reciprocity does not override Pennsylvania’s substantive vehicle restrictions, even when a vehicle is lawfully registered elsewhere. And while we do not typically handle summary traffic offenses, these types of offenses often lead to police encounters that may result in arrests for other charges such as drug or gun offenses.

The Facts of the Case

In October 2024, the defendant was stopped by police in Northumberland County while operating a quadricycle (an off-road vehicle) on a public highway. He was cited under Section 7721(a) of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, which prohibits the operation of ATVs on public streets and highways unless specifically designated for such use.

The defendant contested the citation and was found guilty of the summary offense by a magisterial district judge. He then exercised his right to a de novo appeal to the Court of Common Pleas.

At the summary appeal hearing, the parties stipulated that the defendant was operating an ATV on a Pennsylvania highway. They also stipulated that the vehicle was owned by a Montana-based LLC and properly registered in Montana.

The Legal Argument

Devilbiss argued that Section 1303 of the Motor Vehicle Code, the statute governing nonresident vehicle registration, allowed him to operate the quadricycle on Pennsylvania roads because it was lawfully registered in another state.

According to the defense, Section 1303 provides broad authorization for the operation of any foreign vehicle on Pennsylvania roadways so long as it is validly registered in its home jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that argument and affirmed the conviction.

Devilbiss appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court affirmed, holding that Section 1303 addresses registration requirements only, not whether a particular class of vehicle may lawfully be operated on Pennsylvania highways.

Applying basic principles of statutory interpretation, the Court explained that the plain language of Section 1303 simply exempts nonresident owners from Pennsylvania registration and fees when their vehicles are properly registered elsewhere. It does not authorize vehicles that are otherwise prohibited—such as ATVs—to be driven on public roads.

The Court declined to expand Section 1303 beyond its clear terms and rejected the argument that out-of-state registration could override Section 7721’s explicit prohibition on ATV operation on public highways.

Because the defendant conceded that he was operating an ATV on a roadway where such vehicles are not permitted, the Court found no error of law or abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment of sentence.

The Takeaway

This decision underscores an important distinction in Pennsylvania traffic law: registration reciprocity does not equal roadway permission. Even if a vehicle is properly registered in another state, it still must comply with Pennsylvania’s rules governing what types of vehicles may be operated on public streets and highways.

For drivers, and especially those relying on out-of-state registrations or unconventional vehicles, this case highlights the limits of statutory defenses based on reciprocity provisions. And it also means that driving this type of vehicle on a Pennsylvania street could lead to a lawful stop or police encounter.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 1/10/26 Zak Goldstein 1/10/26

Superior Court Orders New Sentencing Where Judge’s Prior Role Created Appearance of Bias

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Freeman, vacating the judgment of sentence for a juvenile lifer and ordering a new sentencing hearing after concluding that the sentencing judge’s prior role as a prosecutor created an impermissible appearance of bias.

The ruling reinforces an important principle in Pennsylvania criminal law: defendants are entitled not only to a fair judge, but to a judge whose impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned, particularly at sentencing. In other words, a judge must recuse not only when they actually cannot be fair, but also when it appears they might not be able to be fair.

Background

Bryan and David Freeman were 17 and 16 years old, respectively, when they pleaded guilty in 1995 to first-degree murder in connection with the killing of their parents. Under Pennsylvania law at the time, the trial court immediately imposed mandatory life-without-parole sentences. Neither brother filed a direct appeal.

Years later, following the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, which held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional and retroactively invalid, both brothers successfully reopened their cases through PCRA proceedings and were granted new sentencing hearings.

After extensive delays, the cases were reassigned to a new judge, who conducted a multi-day resentencing hearing in February 2024. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court imposed new sentences of 60 years to life for each defendant.

The Motion to Recuse

Before resentencing began, the defense filed a joint motion asking the sentencing judge to recuse himself. The motion was based on the judge’s prior involvement as a prosecutor in two closely related matters:

He had previously represented the Commonwealth on appeal against the Freeman brothers’ co-defendant in the same homicide case.
He had also prosecuted a separate “copycat” murder case in which the Commonwealth’s theory was that the Freeman brothers’ crimes inspired another individual to murder his own parents. During that prosecution, the judge, then an assistant district attorney, made public statements emphasizing the Freeman murders as central to that case.

The defense argued that these prior roles created, at a minimum, an appearance of partiality that required recusal. The trial court denied the motion and proceeded with resentencing. Following sentencing, the defendant appealed.

Superior Court’s Decision

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed.

Relying heavily on Williams v. Pennsylvania, the Court emphasized that the recusal inquiry is objective, not subjective. The issue is not whether the judge believed he could be fair, but whether a reasonable observer could question the judge’s impartiality.

The Court held that the judge’s prior prosecution of the Freeman brothers’ co-defendant based on the same facts and involving the same crimes was sufficiently intertwined with the resentencing proceedings to create an impermissible appearance of bias. The Court further noted that the judge’s role in the related “copycat” murder prosecution strengthened the need for recusal.

Because sentencing is one of the most consequential stages of a criminal case, the Superior Court concluded that the failure to recuse required relief. The Court vacated the judgments of sentence, vacated the order denying recusal, and remanded the cases for new resentencing proceedings before a different judge.

Importantly, the Court did not find actual bias. Instead, it made clear that the appearance of bias alone is sufficient to undermine confidence in the fairness of the proceeding.

The Takeaway

This decision is a powerful reminder that judicial neutrality is not optional, especially in sentencing, PCRA litigation, and juvenile lifer cases. Even decades after a conviction, prior prosecutorial involvement in a related case can disqualify a judge if it creates a reasonable appearance of partiality.

For defendants seeking resentencing, post-conviction relief, or appellate review, Freeman underscores the importance of scrutinizing a judge’s prior role and preserving recusal issues for appeal.

Facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police?

Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.