Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 12/12/20 Zak Goldstein 12/12/20

PA Supreme Court: Police Officer Cannot Testify About "Normal" Response to Sexual Assault Unless Qualified as Expert

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jones, holding that a police officer cannot testify about child sexual abuse victims’ responses and behaviors unless they are properly qualified as an expert. This decision is significant because prosecutors frequently like to use police officers to bolster their complainants’ testimony by having police officers testify as to why they are offering inconsistent testimony, especially in sexual assault cases. Commonwealth v. Jones now holds that although a police officer may testify about typical victim behavior under some circumstances, which the Court did not define, the officer must first at least be properly qualified as an expert before they can offer such testimony.

Commonwealth v. Jones

The defendant was charged with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen years of age, unlawful contact with a minor, aggravated indecent assault, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, and other offenses following allegations by his stepdaughter that he repeatedly sexually abused her over a period of several years. According to the complainant, the first instance of abuse occurred when she was thirteen years old. The defendant told her that no one would believe her if she came forward. However, when the complainant turned 17, she told her mother about the alleged abuse.

The defendant was subsequently arrested and tried by a jury. Throughout the trial, defense counsel focused on discrepancies in the complainant’s version of events in an attempt to undermine her credibility. These discrepancies and inconsistencies related to the timing and the location of these assaults. In an attempt to bolster the complainant’s credibility, the Commonwealth called a detective who had interviewed the complainant during the course of his investigation.

During his direct examination, the detective testified that children can have difficulty remembering all the times they were sexually abused. Defense counsel objected to this and argued that this amounted to expert testimony and the detective had not been qualified as an expert. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony to come in. At the conclusion of the trial, the defendant was subsequently convicted of the aforementioned charges and was sentenced to twenty-seven to sixty years’ imprisonment. The defendant then filed a post-sentence motion which was denied. He then filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court’s Decision

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the detective to testify that child sexual assault victims are often unable to recall specific details and dates of sexual assaults. He further argued that this evidence was actually expert testimony because it was not within the scope of knowledge possessed by the average layperson. Finally, because the detective had not been qualified as an expert witness, the trial court should have not allowed this testimony to be presented at his trial.

In a 2-1 decision, the Superior Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction. The majority explained that challenges to the admissibility of evidence typically rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. The Superior Court found that the detective’s testimony “constituted permissible lay opinion testimony because it was based on information within the detective’s personal knowledge and experience.” Consequently, the Commonwealth did not need to qualify the detective as an expert in order for him to testify. However, the dissenting opinion argued that 42 Pa. C.S. § 5920 was the dispositive statute for this question. According to the dissent, this statute overrules the previous decision in Commonwealth v. Dunkle which held that opinions regarding responses by child sexual assault victims fall within the knowledge of laypersons and thus a witness did not have to qualify as an expert to testify about the behaviors of these victims. Undeterred, the defendant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted.

What is 42 Pa. C.S. § 5920?

42 Pa. C.S. § 5920 is titled “Expert testimony in certain criminal proceedings.” It provides:

(a) Scope.--This section applies to all of the following:
(1) A criminal proceeding for an offense for which registration is required under Subchapter H of Chapter 97 (relating to registration of sexual offenders).1
(2) A criminal proceeding for an offense under 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses).
(b) Qualifications and use of experts.--
(1) In a criminal proceeding subject to this section, a witness may be qualified by the court as an expert if the witness has specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the average layperson based on the witness's experience with, or specialized training or education in, criminal justice, behavioral sciences or victim services issues, related to sexual violence, that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the dynamics of sexual violence, victim responses to sexual violence and the impact of sexual violence on victims during and after being assaulted.
(2) If qualified as an expert, the witness may testify to facts and opinions regarding specific types of victim responses and victim behaviors.
(3) The witness's opinion regarding the credibility of any other witness, including the victim, shall not be admissible.
(4) A witness qualified by the court as an expert under this section may be called by the attorney for the Commonwealth or the defendant to provide the expert testimony.

It should be noted that 42 Pa. C.S. § 5920 was passed after Commonwealth v. Dunkle was decided. Dunkle was a Supreme Court decision which barred expert testimony on typical victim behaviors. As one can see by reading the statute, subsection (2) states “[i]f qualified as an expert, the witness may testify to facts and opinions regarding specific types of victim responses and victim behaviors” which strongly suggests that one must be an expert in order to testify about such things. Therefore, the dissent argued that this statute superseded it and was the controlling authority. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was then tasked with deciding whether this position was correct and whether the trial court improperly admitted the detective’s testimony.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and granted the defendant a new trial. First, the Court held that 42 Pa. C.S. § 5920 at least partially overruled Commonwealth v. Dunkle. Next, the Court reviewed the facts of the instant case and the applicable law. It held that “testimony from a law enforcement officer concerning child victims’ typical behaviors and responses to sexual abuse, when based on that officer’s training and experience, falls within the realm of expert testimony.” Further, the Court continued that the average juror is not privy to the complex psychological dynamics surrounding sexual abuse and thus testimony about such issues cannot be qualified as lay testimony.

The Court found that, in the instant case, the detective provided insights gained through specialized occupational training and experience which was not within the average layperson’s knowledge. As such, the trial court committed an error when it permitted this testimony to be introduced at the defendant’s trial. The next step in the Court’s analysis was to determine whether the inclusion of this testimony amounted to harmless error.

In this case, the Court found that permitting the detective to testify about the stepdaughter’s ability to recall specific details did not qualify as harmless error. Specifically, the Court held that because the Commonwealth emphasized the detective’s training and experience, the jury may have given the detective’s testimony undue weight. Further, because the stepdaughter’s credibility was central to the case, allowing the detective to bolster her credibility by offering his testimony on the behaviors of sexual assault victims wrongfully prejudiced the defendant. Therefore, because the defendant was unfairly prejudiced by this testimony, the Court vacated his conviction, and he will receive a new trial.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We can also help you with an appeal. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 11/12/20 Zak Goldstein 11/12/20

PA Superior Court Allows Individual Challenges to PA's Sex Offender Registration Statute

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, holding that, in some cases, SORNA creates an unconstitutional presumption that a defendant will commit future sex offenses. This is a huge decision because it may provide individual defendants with an opportunity to challenge their registration requirements even if they are convicted of a sex crime. This is particularly important because some crimes require that, if convicted, a defendant register under Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law even when the crime was not sexual in nature. In Muhammad, the Court found that the individual defendant should not have been required to register a a sex offender despite her SORNA conviction because she had no prior record, was unlikely to re-offend, and was convicted of interfering with the custody of a minor, which is not actually a sex crime.

Commonwealth v. Muhammad

The defendant’s sister and her former partner shared custody of their three-year-old child. In 2014, pursuant to a valid custody order, the former partner was to have primary physical custody of the child and the defendant’s sister was to have custody of her on the weekends. Both parties had written notice that if any party felt that another party had violated the order, they were to file a motion in court.

The former partner was incarcerated between April 2015 and June 2016. During this time, the child was in the care of the defendant’s sister. After she was released from prison, the former partner contacted the defendant’s sister so that she could see the child and spend time with him. Upon agreement, the former partner picked up the child in Philadelphia. There was also an agreement that she would return him that following Sunday. While the child was in her care, the former partner noticed that the child had bruises. As such, she decided that she would not return the child to the defendant’s sister.

On that Monday, the defendant’s sister arrived at the former partner’s house in Reading, Pennsylvania. She was accompanied by the defendant and her friend. The defendant’s sister grabbed the child and tried to put him in the vehicle. A struggle ensued with other members of the former partner’s family. Eventually the defendant drove away with her sister, the child, and the former partner’s 17-year-old daughter. While driving, the 17-year-old daughter began yelling for help. The defendant told the 17-year-old daughter that she was not going home.

The Reading Police were called and they attempted to call the defendant as she was driving away. Eventually, an officer was able to speak with the defendant and he told her to bring the children back home. The defendant told the officer that she was not going to do that. She would also not let the 17-year-old daughter speak to the police either. Eventually, the defendant drove to the Chestnut Hill train station where they gave the three-year-old child to the defendant’s mother and sister. The defendant then drove to the bus station in Philadelphia. The defendant bought the 17-year-old a bus ticket back to Reading. The 17-year-old then borrowed a stranger’s phone and called the former partner and told her what happened. The Reading police arrived in Philadelphia and drove the 17-year-old home. The next day, the three-year-old child was returned to the former partner.

The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with interference with custody of children, false imprisonment, unlawful restraint, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. The defendant elected to proceed by bench trial where she was subsequently found guilty of all charges. Unfortunately, because of her conviction for interference with the custody of children, she was required to register under SORNA despite the fact that she had not even committed a sex crime.

Prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a motion raising a series of constitutional challenges to SORNA. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion. She was subsequently sentenced to three to twenty-three months’ imprisonment and was forced to register under SORNA. Notably, at her sentencing, the trial court found that this was the defendant’s first contact with the criminal justice system and this incident was “totally out of character for her.”

The defendant then filed a timely post-sentence motions which were denied. She then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, she argued that SORNA was unconstitutional as it created an irrebuttable presumption that those who are convicted of the enumerated offenses “pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses.” The defendant further argued that this deprives individuals like her of the fundamental right to reputation.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court reversed the lower court and held that the defendant did not have to register under SORNA. The Court found that the defendant’s appeal amounted to an “irrebuttable presumption” challenge. An irrebuttable presumption is unconstitutional when it 1) encroaches on an interested protected by the due process clause, 2) the presumption is not universally true, and 3) reasonable alternative means exist for ascertaining the presumed fact. The Superior Court then applied this test to the specific facts of the defendant’s case.

In doing so, the Superior Court found that “SORNA encroaches on a due process right of [the defendant].” According to the Superior Court, registering as a sex offender creates a presumption that the defendant is a dangerous adult who is likely to commit further sexual offenses. This designation would affect her future employment prospects and limit her ability to obtain education and housing. Consequently, she would have a difficult time functioning as a productive member of society. Further, the Superior Court also stated that the current SORNA statute fails to provide the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to rebut the claim that she is a danger to reoffend.

The Superior Court then reviewed the record to see if whether SORNA’s presumption that sexual offenders present a high risk of recidivating was applicable for the defendant. In this case, there was no evidence that the defendant intended to commit any sexual acts towards anyone. Further, this was her first conviction for any crime. As the trial court stated during her sentencing hearing, this was “out of character” for the defendant. Therefore, there was no evidence to suggest that she was at a high risk to commit any sexual offenses.

Finally, the Superior Court found that there are other reasonable alternatives exist to determine whether someone is at risk of being a sex offender. According to the Superior Court, the Commonwealth could have utilized the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board to determine whether the defendant was at risk for engaging in sexual misconduct. They did not do that in this case. Therefore, the Superior Court found that the facts of the defendant’s case satisfy all the requirements that she was unconstitutionally presumed to be a sex offender. Therefore, the order that she must comply with SORNA is vacated and she will no longer have to register as a sex offender.

It is not totally clear yet what the long term effects of this ruling will be or if it will be appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. However, based on this ruling, it may be possible to challenge the registration requirements at sentencing for a defendant who has been convicted of a SORNA offense.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 8/25/20 Zak Goldstein 8/25/20

PA Superior Court: Megan's Law Registrant May Challenge Retroactive Changes to Registration Laws Outside of PCRA Process

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Duncan. This decision did not make any substantive changes in the law. Rather, it dealt with some of the procedural difficulties that defendants have had in challenging their sex offender registration status following recent changes in the law stemming from Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Superior Court decisions. In this case, the court held that the defendant should have been appointed counsel to represent him when he was challenging the requirement that he register as a sex offender despite being a juvenile when he committed the crimes which triggered registration. This decision makes it clear that registrants may bring challenges to their registration status in the trial court in many cases even when the time for filing a post-conviction relief act petition has expired.

Commonwealth v. Duncan

The defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to the charges of robbery, kidnapping of a minor, unlawful restraint, recklessly endangering another person, and carrying firearms without a license. The defendant received a sentenced of 4-10 years’ imprisonment. Notably, the defendant was a juvenile when he committed his offenses, even though he was charged as an adult. The defendant did not file a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence.

More than a decade after his plea, the defendant filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. The defendant alleged that right before he was to be released from prison, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections told him that he must register as a sex offender upon his release pursuant to the then-effective version of Megan’s Law. This would be due to the kidnapping of a minor conviction. The defendant argued that requiring him to register as a sex offender violated the Ex Post Facto principles of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz. Further, the defendant argued that the Commonwealth was in breach of their agreement because he had never agreed to register as a sex offender. At the time that he pleaded guilty, that charge did not require sex offender registration.

The court initially treated his petition as a Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. At first, the PCRA court agreed with the defendant and ordered that he be removed from the sex offender registry. However, the PCRA court later vacated its decision to allow the Commonwealth an opportunity to respond to his petition. The Commonwealth responded that his request should be denied because it was an untimely filed PCRA petition. The PCRA imposes very strict deadlines and if a defendant misses a deadline they will often not be afforded any relief. Consequently, because the PCRA court thought the PCRA governed the defendant’s petition, it denied his request due to his petition being untimely. The defendant was subsequently appointed counsel, and he then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant only argued that he should have been appointed counsel to help him litigate his claim.

The Ex Post Facto Clause of The United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions

Both the United States and the Pennsylvania Constitutions prohibit Ex Post Facto laws. Those are laws that criminalize past behavior. The reason behind is that individuals have the right to adequate notice and should not be punished for actions that were legal when they did took them. In order to qualify as an Ex Post Facto law, the law must 1) apply retroactively and 2) negatively impact the offender.

In the late ‘90s and early 2000’s, states across the country began passing laws that required individuals convicted of sexual offenses to register as sex offenders. These early Megan’s Law statutes imposed onerous requirements on defendants that were often seemingly punitive in nature. These laws were frequently challenged as violations of the Ex Post Facto clause because they applied to defendants retroactively (i.e. defendants were required to register as sex offenders even though they committed their crimes before the passage of these statutes).

Pennsylvania and many other states would argue that these Megan’s Law requirements were not punitive and therefore the Ex Post Facto clause of their respective constitutions did not apply. And, unfortunately, some of these governments had some success. For example, the state of Alaska was successfully able to defend its Megan’s Law statute all the way to the United States Supreme Court. However, in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in Commonwealth v. Muniz that Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law statute violated the Ex Post Facto clauses of both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a new Megan’s Law (SORNA) statute in the aftermath of the Muniz decision which certainly guarantees that this fight is far from over.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the defendant that he should have been appointed an attorney to represent him when he litigated his PCRA petition. The Court further stated that the PCRA court was not required to treat the defendant’s petition as a PCRA petition. Specifically, the Superior Court cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lacombe which held that because he was raising Ex Post Facto claims, the PCRA court was not required to treat his filing as a PCRA petition and therefore he was not subjected to the stringent filing deadlines of the PCRA. Further, the Superior Court stated that the defendant “might have a valid Ex Post Facto and due process claim” and therefore remanded his case for consideration. This is an important decision due to the deadline issues. The PCRA requires a defendant to file his or her post-conviction relief act petition within one year of his or her sentence becoming final. Obviously, when the legislature passes a new law ten years later imposing new sex offender requirements on someone who did not have to register at that time that they were convicted, that person should have some procedural mechanism for challenging the law. By imposing the one-year deadline for filing a PCRA petition on these petitioners, the courts were able to block them from ever challenging these unconstitutional laws. By recognizing that these filings are not really PCRAs, the appellate courts have removed some of the deadlines for filing them and allowed these important issues to be resolved on the merits.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/11/20 Zak Goldstein 5/11/20

Title IX Update: US Dept of Education Releases New Guidelines for Campus Sexual Assault Allegations

The United States Department of Education has released new guidelines on how colleges and universities are to handle sexual assault allegations on college campuses. Secretary of Education Betsy Devos said that these new regulations will allow colleges and universities to “combat sexual misconduct without abandoning our core values of fairness, presumption of innocence, and due process.”

For the better part of the decade, individuals who were accused of sexual assault had scant protections. Specifically, there were reports that colleges and universities felt obligated to side with the accusers based on Obama Administration guidelines that were issued in 2011 and 2014. Those guidelines threatened severe repercussions (i.e. losing federal funding) if they did not ramp up their investigations. They also led to many schools starting investigations based on a belief that they should believe the complainant instead of applying a presumption of innocence. Now, although the new regulations are not perfect, accused students should find themselves with more rights and protections when confronted with potentially false allegations of sexual assault and harassment.

What is Title IX and How Does it Relate to Sexual Assault Allegations?

Title IX is a federal civil rights law signed by President Richard Nixon in 1972 as part of a larger Education bill. At its core, Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in educational institutions when those institutions receive federal aid. Title IX also makes schools responsible for taking steps to prevent sex-based harassment, including sexual harassment, and for responding quickly and effectively to harassment when it occurs.

What Are the New Changes to Title IX Investigation Procedures?

The new regulations provide a number of increased protections to students who have been accused of sexual misconduct or sexual harassment.

First, and perhaps most importantly, the guidelines require that a school apply a presumption of innocence. Previously, schools were permitted to start from a position of assuming that a complaint must be true. Under the new rules, the school must require some evidence in order to find an accused student responsible and impose sanctions.

Second, the regulations modify the recommended burden of proof which schools should apply in deciding whether or not the accused has committed a violation. Under the previous regulations, schools were encouraged to apply a “preponderance of the evidence standard.” Under a preponderance of the evidence standard, the school would find against the accused if the fact-finder found that it was 51% or more likely that the accused committed a violation. The new guidelines allow schools to require “clear and convincing evidence,” which is a higher standard than 51%. This is the standard used in many family court proceedings such as child custody cases. It is, however, still a lesser burden than requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt as is usually required in a criminal case. Schools may also continue to use the preponderance of the evidence standard. But if they do so, they must still apply that lower standard to accusations made against their own employees.

Third, the new rules require that the accused receive a live hearing in front of the decision maker. The previous regulations encouraged the use of the single investigator model. Under the single investigator model, a school that had received a complaint would then retain an investigator to resolve the complaint. This would often be an outside attorney or retired law enforcement officer who had been retained by the school specifically to resolve these issues. That investigator would review the complaint, speak with the complainant and the accused, interview potential witnesses, review any other evidence provided by the parties such as text messages or medical reports, and then make findings of fact as to whether or not the sexual harassment or assault had occurred. Depending on the school, the investigator may also recommend the punishment for an offense, but at some schools, a board of faculty members would decide on punishment without hearing from the accused student directly.

The new rules eliminate this procedure. No matter what standard of proof a school decides to apply, the accused student is now entitled to an in-person hearing in front of the person or people that will make the decisions as to guilt or innocence and the penalty in the case of a finding of guilt. This is a significant change as it ensures some level of due process. Instead of simply giving a statement to an investigator and being found guilty, the accused student may now present a defense to the people making the decisions.

Fourth, the rules also provide that the accused shall have the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant. This generally does not mean that the individual student gets to ask questions of the complainant himself or herself. Instead, the accused’s faculty counselor or attorney may ask the questions or submit the questions to the fact-finder for them to ask the questions. Further, the parties may appear remotely by video. Cross-examination allows the accused student the opportunity to challenge the complainant’s story and demonstrate potential credibility problems or motive to fabricate. This is an extremely important change because sexual assault cases often hinge on how credible the alleged victim is.

Fifth, colleges and universities will now only be responsible for investigating cases that occurred within their programs or their activities. For example, a school would not be liable for an alleged assault that occurred in an apartment that is not affiliated with the school.

Finally, schools may not impose any sanctions on an accused student until the case has been adjudicated. A school may still, however, impose temporary restraining orders prohibiting contact between the parties. A school may also remove a student from campus if there is a finding that the student is an immediate, dangerous risk to safety.

These regulations become effective on August 15, 2020. Accordingly, they will be in place by the time students return to campus for the fall semester. There is no doubt that there will be some growing pains with these regulations, and it is likely that there will be legal challenges to them as well. The regulations also do not necessarily prevent schools from continuing to enforce rules which are worse for the accused than those suggested by the guidelines. However, they remove much of the pressure on schools to enforce rules which give the accused no opportunity to defend themselves. Therefore, this is an important step in providing accused students with a fair opportunity to present a defense. Contrary to some negative reporting in the press, the guidelines do not suggest that schools should not take complaints seriously or believe the accused. They simply add some level of due process to the proceedings so that accused students have a chance to defend themselves and obtain a fair result.

How Can a Title IX Defense Attorney Help if You Are Accused of Sexual Misconduct on Campus?

The processes currently in place prior to the new regulations gave very little thought to the rights of the accused. However, many schools may begin to change their policies in order to implement the new guidelines, and each school’s disciplinary processes will likely be somewhat different. For that reason, anyone accused of sexual misconduct should not attempt to go it alone. Nor should they allow any kind of embarrassment they may feel to silence them.

Given the potential consequences, which can include expulsion from school without a refund and a permanent notation on the students transcript, someone accused of this sort of sexual misconduct must reach out to an attorney as quickly as possible. An attorney who has previously represented other students at one of these hearings can best guide the accused in how to defend themselves. The first days following an accusation are among the most important and if you have been informed you are under investigation, there are certain steps that must happen as quickly as possible. An experienced defense attorney may be able to help you with the following things:

Preparing to give a statement to the school’s Title IX Investigator
Reviewing and editing written submissions which may be required as part of the investigation
Conducting a thorough investigation into the allegations, including locating third-party witnesses and obtaining witness statements
Obtaining and preserving digital and social media evidence such as text messages, Facebook posts
Providing advice on how to avoid criminal charges while responding to the allegations
Helping you to understand the school’s procedures for the investigation and potential appeals and making sure that you understand all of your rights
Presenting a defense at a hearing and conducting cross-examination as schools begin to provide enhanced protections

Facing Criminal Charges or a Campus Investigation? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or are under investigation by the police or campus authorities, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We also have extensive experience defending clients against allegations of sexual misconduct in Title IX investigations. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.