Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 4/3/25 Zak Goldstein 4/3/25

PA Superior Court Reverses Rule 600 Dismissal in Commonwealth v. Farlow, Holds Rule 1013 Exclusively Governs Speedy Trial in Philadelphia Municipal Court

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

In Commonwealth v. Farlow, 2025 PA Super 76, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed an order dismissing charges on Rule 600 speedy trial grounds, holding instead that Rule 1013—not Rule 600—governs speedy trial calculations in cases tried in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Court held that pre-arrest delay is essentially not an issue in a misdemeanor case in Philadelphia because Rule 1013’s speedy trial requirement runs from preliminary arraignment (which typically occurs when the defendant is arrested) rather than when the police file a criminal complaint (which may happen long before the arrest).

Background

The defendant was charged on September 20, 2021, with simple assault and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”) based on conduct which allegedly occurred on August 22, 2021. The police promptly obtained an arrest warrant, but they did not arrest the defendant until March 21, 2023, which was over eighteen months later. The defendant was also originally charged with a felony aggravated assault charge, so the defendant was entitled to a preliminary hearing in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Municipal Court judge dismissed the aggravated assault charge at that hearing, and so the remaining misdemeanor charges were remanded for trial in the Philadelphia Municipal Court.

On the scheduled trial date of May 23, 2023, the defendant argued a motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, arguing that Commonwealth had not acted with due diligence during the pre-arrest period in locating the defendant and arresting her. The Commonwealth was ready for trial on that date, but if the time between the filing of the complaint and the arrest counted for speedy trial purposes, then the Commonwealth would have already violated Rule 600. Rule 1013 requires a defendant in a Municipal Court case to be brought to trial within 180 days of preliminary arraignment, but Rule 600, which applies to all Common Pleas cases, requires a defendant to be brought to trial within 365 days of the filing of the criminal complaint. Thus, if Rule 600 also applied, then the Commonwealth violated the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

The Municipal Court judge agreed with the defendant that both rules applied and dismissed the case. The Commonwealth appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, and the Common Pleas judge affirmed. That judge reasoned that Rule 600 governed the case with respect to the lengthy pre-arrest delay and Rule 1013’s silence on that issue. More than a year had passed from the filing of the criminal complaint, so the Common Pleas judge affirmed the dismissal of the charges.

The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that Rule 1013 should apply to cases remanded for trial in Municipal Court and that, under Rule 1013’s timeline, no violation had occurred because Rule 1013 does not include pre-arrest delay in the calculation. Instead, time begins running under Rule 1013 essentially at arrest.

The Superior Court’s Analysis

The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth and clarified that Rule 1013—not Rule 600—governs speedy trial rights in cases ordered to be tried in the Philadelphia Municipal Court even if the case was initially filed as a felony. The Court held that Rule 1013(A)(3) explicitly provides for a 180-day deadline starting from the date of preliminary arraignment or the order transferring the case, whichever is greater.

Because the defendant was preliminarily arraigned on March 22, 2023, and the charges were dismissed before the 180-day period expired, the Superior Court found no Rule 1013 violation and reversed the dismissal.

The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that Rule 600 should apply to pre-arrest delay in such cases under Rule 1000(B). While acknowledging the potential due process concerns created by prolonged pre-arrest delay, the Court emphasized that neither Rule 600 nor Rule 1013 includes language covering that specific issue in this context. Notably, the Court found that while Rule 1013 accounts for pre-arrest delay when a defendant appears by summons, it intentionally begins the trial clock at arraignment in arrest warrant cases, signaling a deliberate drafting choice.

Takeaway

Interpreting the rules in this matter leads to a bizarre result. If the defendant had waived the preliminary hearing and agreed to have the felony charges tried in the Court of Common Pleas, then Rule 600 would have applied, and the case should have been dismissed. But because the defendant was successful at the preliminary hearing in having the felony dismissed and the case remanded, the defendant gave up the speedy trial defense available under Rule 600. That makes no sense as the defendant should not have to waive the preliminary hearing in order to then have a more serious case dismissed. Further, this interpretation of the rules means that the Commonwealth has no obligation to find and arrest a defendant for a less serious misdemeanor case, but the Commonwealth must promptly arrest a defendant for a felony case or the felony could be dismissed. Essentially, it makes it more likely that a more serious case will be dismissed on speedy trial grounds rather than a less serious case. Further, the rules are simply silent on whether Rule 600 applies in the absence of a specific provision in Rule 1013 to the contrary. Hopefully, the defendant will seek reargument or petition the Supreme Court.

This decision serves as a crucial reminder that in Philadelphia, once a felony charge is dismissed and the case is remanded to the Municipal Court for trial on remaining misdemeanor charges, Rule 1013 governs the speedy trial timeline. While Rule 600 begins the clock at the filing of the complaint and covers pre-arrest delay, Rule 1013 begins at the preliminary arraignment—effectively excluding pre-arrest periods from its calculus.

Defense attorneys handling cases where the charges may get remanded must now decide whether it may make sense to actually waive the preliminary hearing in order to retain stronger speedy trial protections rather than contesting the charges at the preliminary hearing and giving up the protections of Rule 600 in a case involving a lengthy pre-arrest delay. This is a difficult decision to make as the defense may not have discovery which shows the reason for the pre-arrest delay at the time of the preliminary hearing. Alternatively, the Court left open the possibility of challenging pre-arrest delays under constitutional due process principles.

Citation: Commonwealth v. Farlow, 2025 PA Super 76 (Mar. 28, 2025).

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 4/1/25 Zak Goldstein 4/1/25

PA Superior Court: Shining Flashlight Into Small Opening of Shoebox Violates Plain View Doctrine

Pennsylvania Superior Court Reverses Conviction Based on Warrantless Shoebox Search

Zak Goldstein Criminal Defense Lawyer — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

In Commonwealth v. Herlth, 2025 PA Super 73, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a drug conviction after concluding that a warrantless search of a shoebox violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The ruling serves as a clear reaffirmation of privacy rights in closed containers within the home—even during police responses to medical emergencies.

The Facts of Herlth

The case arose out of an incident which occurred on August 31, 2020, when Pennsylvania State Police responded to a report of a drug overdose at a residence in Red Lion, Pennsylvania. EMS personnel were already inside administering care to the defendant when a state police trooper entered the house. The trooper was not there to provide medical assistance, but he wanted to ensure the safety of the EMS responders and “see what [the patient] overdosed on to possibly make an investigation further, anything that’s in plain view that we can see.”

While standing in a small living room near the defendant’s feet, the trooper noticed a closed shoebox next to the defendant’s leg. He then shined his flashlight into a manufacturer’s hole in the box and saw what appeared to be “scramble” capsules which were commonly used to package fentanyl and other drugs. Believing that the defendant had overdosed on these capsules, the trooper opened the box and seized a bag containing 117 capsules.

The defendant was arrested and charged with possession with the intent to deliver. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the trooper conducted an illegal warrantless search of his house and the shoebox. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and allowed the introduction of the evidence at trial. The court reasoned that the drugs were in plain view because the trooper was able to find them without actually opening the shoebox even though the trooper could not see them without using his flashlight. The court found the defendant guilty of PWID and sentenced him to seven to fourteen years’ incarceration. He appealed.

The Legal Issue: Was the Search Justified by the Plain View Doctrine?

On appeal, the defendant challenged the warrantless search and seizure, arguing that the use of a flashlight to examine the interior of a closed shoebox exceeded the scope of any permissible exception to the warrant requirement.

The Superior Court agreed. The Court explained the three essential requirements for the plain view doctrine to apply:

The officer must lawfully be in the vantage point from which the object is viewed;
The incriminating nature of the object must be immediately apparent (i.e., there must be probable cause);
The officer must have lawful access to the object.

While the Court acknowledged that the defendant lawfully entered the home under the “community caretaking” doctrine to ensure EMS safety, it held that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy the other two prongs of the test.

Specifically, the shoebox was a closed, opaque container, not an item whose incriminating character was immediately apparent. There was no way for the trooper to observe the contents without manipulating the container by shining a flashlight into a manufacturer’s hole—an investigative act which itself constituted a search.

Reliance on Key Precedent

The Court drew heavily on Commonwealth v. Graham, 721 A.2d 1075 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Norris, 446 A.2d 246 (Pa. 1982). In both cases, the Pennsylvania courts held that police may not use the plain view doctrine to justify extending a search into containers or concealed areas unless the object is already visible and the officer has lawful access.

In Graham, for example, the officer shined a flashlight into the defendant’s pocket after a Terry frisk had concluded, ultimately discovering contraband. The Supreme Court found that flashlight use in that context transformed an otherwise valid frisk into an unlawful search. Likewise, in Norris, officers were justified in seizing a knife on a nightstand but were not permitted to search under a mattress for a hidden firearm after the emergency had ended.

Why the Flashlight Made the Search Unlawful

Although courts have upheld flashlight use when illuminating objects that would otherwise be visible during the day, that principle did not apply here. The Superior Court emphasized that the scramble pills inside the shoebox were not in plain view; even in full daylight, they would have remained hidden inside the closed box. The use of a flashlight to peer into the hole was not passive illumination—it was a directed, investigative act taken without a warrant or exigent justification.

Outcome

The Superior Court reversed the denial of suppression, vacated the judgment of sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. One judge dissented, so the Commonwealth may file for review by the entire court.

Key Takeaways

The case underscores the robust privacy protections for closed containers inside a residence.
Police officers responding to overdoses or other emergencies must avoid converting caretaking roles into investigative searches unless they obtain a warrant or meet one of the narrow exceptions.
The plain view doctrine does not permit flashlight-aided searches of opaque containers without probable cause and lawful access.

This decision reinforces a critical constitutional limit on police authority and serves as a cautionary tale: even in good-faith responses to public health emergencies, law enforcement must respect established privacy rights.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein 2/9/25 Zak Goldstein 2/9/25

Attorney Goldstein Wins Motion to Suppress Firearm

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won a motion to suppress a firearm in the case of Commonwealth v. J.C. In J.C., the client was charged with carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia (VUFA § 6108), possession of a concealed firearm without a license (VUFA § 6106), possession of a controlled substance (K&I), and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (VUFA § 6105). Prosecutors claimed that J.C. had a firearm in the glovebox of his car and marijuana in a bag sitting on the back seat of the vehicle.

Attorney Goldstein filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the police improperly searched J.G.’s car without first obtaining a search warrant. Although they later obtained a search warrant before actually removing the gun from the vehicle, the police had already seen the gun due to the initial search before they obtained the warrant.

At a hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth called one of the arresting officers to testify as to the circumstances of the stop and search. The officer testified that they attempted to pull J.C. over for window tint. He initially pulled over right away, but then he started driving again for about half of a block. The police then pulled behind him again and waited for backup. As they were sitting and waiting for backup, they observed J.C. moving around the car in a furtive manner as if he were reaching for something, attempting to conceal something, or about to take off. They also believed that he was going to flee based on the way he was looking around.

Accordingly, once backup arrived, the police surrounded the car. J.C. repeatedly asked why they had stopped him and why they were trying to search the car. He provided them with his driver’s license, and he insisted that he had the registration and insurance paperwork on his phone. The police began to pull him out of the car, and he did not immediately go with them, so they then tased him. Once they tased him, they put him in handcuffs, arrested him, and took him to the hospital for medical treatment. After he was out of the car and had been tased, the officer looked in the glove box and saw a gun. The police then held the vehicle until detectives arrived and obtained a search warrant. At that point, they recovered the gun and the marijuana. J.C. had a criminal record which prohibited him from carrying a firearm, and he also did not have a license to carry.

Attorney Goldstein moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the initial warrantless search of the vehicle was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution and tainted the search warrant which the police obtained later. Attorney Goldstein also argued that the police did not have exigent circumstances for the search that would justify failing to get the warrant first.

Through cross-examination and body camera footage, Attorney Goldstein established that the police had not seen J.C. do anything other than drive a car that may have had window tint, he pulled over on command, he moved the car only about half a block before pulling over again, he told them that he had moved not to flee but because he was blocking traffic, and that they could not see in the car to see if he was actually doing anything while they were waiting for backup. Additionally, J.C. did not attempt to flee, he did not drive away, the police did not see any contraband in the vehicle, and he gave them his driver’s license. Accordingly, there was no actual reason to believe he was armed and dangerous. Further, once J.C. was out of the car and had been tased and arrested, the police were obviously not going to let him get back in the car. Instead, they had to take him to the hospital. Accordingly, under the recent case of Commonwealth v. Camacho, any exigent circumstances which might have justified a “frisk” of the vehicle and checking the glove box for a weapon had dissipated.

In general, the police must obtain a search warrant prior to searching a car. There are some exceptions, however. For example, the police may conduct a “frisk” of the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons when they have conducted a legal stop and they have reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity and armed and dangerous. The frisk cannot be a search for evidence; instead, it is a search for weapons for officer safety purposes during the stop. Nervousness alone does not justify the frisk of a car, but nervousness along with furtive movements or other strange behavior may sometimes justify a frisk.

In this case, however, any need to conduct the frisk before obtaining a warrant ended when J.C. was removed from the car, tased, handcuffed, and arrested. At that point, even if he had initially posed some sort of threat to the officers’ safety, the threat had ended, and there was nothing preventing the officers from simply waiting until detectives could obtain a warrant. The trial judge agreed and granted the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth then withdrew the charges.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

Zak Goldstein 1/30/25 Zak Goldstein 1/30/25

PA Superior Court: Confessions Made to Police Officers at Church Do Not Qualify for Clergy-Penitent Privilege

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Ross, holding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress a confession made to a police officer because the clergy-penitent privilege did not apply even though the defendant knew the officer from church.

The Facts of Ross

The defendant was convicted of rape, unlawful contact with a minor, endangering the welfare of children, corruption of minors, indecent assault, and incest following a 2020 jury trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The case stemmed from an incident that took place on August 13, 2014. The defendant allegedly entered the bedroom of his 15-year-old foster daughter and sexually assaulted her. The defendant’s adult daughter saw him leaving the complainant’s room and alerted the defendant’s wife. She immediately called the police and kicked him out of the house.

After being expelled from the home, the defendant sought guidance from his pastor. His pastor was a longtime friend and fellow minister. After the defendant told the pastor that he fondled the complainant, the pastor then contacted a Philadelphia Police Officer who was also a pastor and co-host of a religious radio show and asked the officer to meet with the defendant at their church. The officer went to the church, and the defendant admitted to fondling the complainant to the officer. The officer then drove the defendant to the Special Victims Unit (SVU) to turn himself in.

The defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with multiple sexual offenses. He moved to suppress the statement to his pastor as well as the statement to the officer. The trial court excluded the statement which was made to the pastor under the clergy-penitent privilege, but it denied the motion with respect to the officer. The court found that the officer was acting as an officer and not as a pastor, and so the defendant was not entitled to the clergy-penitent privilege.

The defendant proceeded by way of jury trial, and the jury convicted him. The trial court sentenced him to 27.5 - 55 years’ incarceration and required him to register as a sex offender for life under SORNA. The defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

The Superior Court Appeal

The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that:

His statements to the police officer should have been suppressed because he made them while he was in custody and he had not received his Miranda warnings.
His confession to the officer should have been excluded under the clergy privilege because the officer was off-duty and present in the church in a religious capacity rather than acting as a police officer.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court rejected both claims and affirmed the conviction.

Miranda Violation Claim Denied: The Superior Court found that the defendant was not in custody when he made his statements to the officer. His meeting with the officer was voluntary, and he agreed to turn himself in. The officer was off-duty and never arrested the defendant. Instead, the pastor called the officer, and the defendant agreed to speak with him at the church. The police do not have to give Miranda warnings to someone who is not in custody because Miranda only applies to custodial interrogations. The defendant was not in custody at the church when he made the statement to the officer, so the officer did not have to provide Miranda warnings in order for the statement to be admissible at trial. The Court also noted that although the defendant filed a motion to suppress based on the lack of Miranda warnings, his attorney did not really pursue that claim at the motions hearing.
Clergy Privilege Claim Rejected: The Court agreed that the defendant’s initial conversation with his pastor was privileged, but it ruled that the privilege did not extend to statements made in the presence of the officer. The Court found that the defendant viewed the officer as a trusted police officer or friend, not a spiritual advisor, and sought his assistance in surrendering to authorities. The Court reached this conclusion even though the officer was also a pastor. It concluded that the officer was not acting as the defendant’s pastor as the time but instead there to help him turn himself in.

The clergy-penitent privilege is codified under Pennsylvania law. It provides:

23 Pa.C.S. § 5943. Confidential communications to clergymen.
No clergyman, priest, rabbi or minister of the gospel of any regularly established church or religious organization, except clergymen or ministers, who are self-ordained or who are members of religious organizations in which members other than the leader thereof are deemed clergymen or ministers, who while in the course of his duties has acquired information from any person secretly and in confidence shall be compelled, or allowed without consent of such person, to disclose that information in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any government unit.

The problem for the defendant here is that both the trial court and Superior Court found that the officer was not acting in his course of duties as a pastor at the time of the confession. Therefore, the privilege did not apply.

The Takeaway

Ultimately, the result here is not particularly surprising. Non-custodial, voluntary confessions to police officers are typically going to be admissible in court even if the police officer knows the defendant from church. This case, however, highlights that Miranda rights only apply to custodial interrogations. If the defendant is not in custody and interrogated, then they are not entitled to Miranda warnings. Further, the remedy for a Miranda violation is the suppression of the statement; it is not necessarily the dismissal of the case. Additionally, privileges are important, but they only apply in limited circumstances. The clergy-penitent privilege does not apply unless the person is acting within the scope of their religious duties, and here, the officer was obviously a police officer rather than the defendant’s pastor. The privilege also does not apply when a third party is present. Therefore, the Superior Court denied the appeal.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in state or federal court in Pennsylvania? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.