Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 8/8/23 Zak Goldstein 8/8/23

PA Superior Court: Police May Search Car and Defendant Without Warrant When Defendant Has Gun and Drugs in Plain View

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Green, affirming a Philadelphia trial court’s finding that police officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was in possession of illegal narcotics and a firearm where the defendant was sitting inside of a car that police believed to be abandoned with drug paraphernalia in plain view, the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the car, and the outline of what police believed to be a gun in his pocket. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allocatur on the issue of whether the plain view exception to the warrant requirement applies to automobiles, The moral of the story is that it is ill-advised to keep your guns and drugs in plain view where the police can see them.

The Facts of Green

On June 1, 2019, two Philadelphia Police officers were on routine patrol in a marked police vehicle and investigating complaints of narcotic sales and illegally parked vehicles near the West Poplar Apartment Complex. One officer was familiar with the housing complex as he had worked in that district for more than ten years and made numerous narcotics and firearms arrests in that apartment complex and area. One of the officers noticed a white Chevy Malibu he believed had been parked in the complex, unmoved, for about two weeks. The officers pulled up to investigate the vehicle, believing that it may have been abandoned. The officers approached on foot, noticed the vehicle’s inspection stickers were peeling off and it had damage to the body of the vehicle. They smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the car. The vehicle had tinted windows, and as one officer went to the front to look through the windshield, he noticed the defendant in the front passenger seat fully reclined. The officer then noticed small vials and plastic baggies, which he recognized to be consistent with narcotics packaging for crack cocaine, as well as “blunt guts” scattered around the vehicle.

As the officer took a closer look at the defendant through the windshieled, he noticed the outline of a firearm in the front pocket of the defendant’s tight-fitting sweatsuit. The officer could see the entire imprint of the firearm. That officer notified his partner he believed he saw a firearm and radioed for backup.

One police officer attempted to speak with the defendant by knocking on the windshield and requesting that the defendant step out of the vehicle and provide paperwork. The defendant opened his eyes slightly and then closed them again as if he were checking if the officers were still there and then pretending to be asleep. The police were unable to get him to respond.

The officers attempted to make contact for fifteen minutes. They were on the verge of calling for a SWAT team, but their supervisor directed them to break the windows and pull the defendant out of the car. They did so, and they recovered a 9mm pistol from the defendant and placed him under arrest.

The Criminal Charges

The defendant was charged with carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a firearm on the public streets of Philadelphia without a license (VUFA § 6106 and § 6108). Both these offenses are violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm, and the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The judge found him guilty following a bench trial, and he appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. First, the Court explained the typical rules that may apply to this type of police encounter. Pennsylvania Courts have developed three categories of interactions between citizens and police officers to better determine if an individual’s rights are being infringed. The categories are:

1) a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion but is not an order and can be completely ignored.

2) an “investigative detention” which must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects the individual to a stop and a period of detention but does not rise to the level of the functional equivalent of arrest, and

3) “custodial detention,” or the functional equivalent of an arrest, which must be supported by probable cause.

A person is subject to an investigative detention, which requires reasonable suspicion, when a reasonable person in their position would not feel free to leave.

In this case, the Superior Court concluded that the officers did not need any level of suspicion to approach the parked car on foot, but they needed reasonable suspicion to break the windows and pull the defendant out of the car. The Court, however, found that they had reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances - the defendant was in a car which had numerous obvious motor vehicle code violations, there was drug paraphernalia in plain view, he pretended he did not see the police even though he opened his eyes, and he also had a gun on him.

Accordingly, the police were justified in breaking into the car and removing him from the vehicle. Whether or not the police may retrieve contraband from a car when the contraband is in plain view is still an open question; as previously mentioned, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted review on that issue. So far, however, the Superior Court has repeatedly held that police may enter a car to retrieve obviously visible contraband even without a search warrant. The police ordinarily may not search a car without a warrant, but when guns and drugs are out in the open, the police may not need to get a warrant.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 7/25/23 Zak Goldstein 7/25/23

PA Superior Court: Adult Conviction May Require SORNA Registration for Some Offenses Committed as Juvenile

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Asbury, holding that a sentence including lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as a Sexually Violent Predator(SVP) may be imposed on a defendant convicted as an adult for acts committed as a juvenile. This holding also applies to individuals charged as adults for crimes they committed as juveniles. This means that an individual could commit a crime qualified as a non-delinquent act while under the age of eighteen and not be tried or convicted of that act until they are 35 and still be required, under SORNA, to register as a sex offender for the remainder of their life. In most cases, SORNA registration does not apply to offenses committed as a juvenile, but as Asbury shows, there are some exceptions to that general rule.

The Facts of Asbury

The defendant was sixteen years old when he committed two counts of rape by forcible compulsion. The first count involved the use of a firearm to aid in the commission of the offense, and the second count involved physically overpowering the victim with no weapon used. The first count is not considered a delinquent act under the Juvenile Act codified under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 because the defendant was over the age of fifteen at the time of the rape and it involved the use of a deadly weapon. Instead, Pennsylvania law provides that this conduct is only a crime rather than a delinquent act. Part of the guilty plea that was agreed upon by both parties was that the defendant was to have the court determine whether he was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The determination whether the defendant should register as a sex offender was only for the first count as that count involved a handgun. The second count, which did not involve a deadly weapon, would not trigger sex offender registration because the defendant committed the crime as a juvenile.

The court also ordered the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) to conduct an assessment of the defendant to determine if he met the criteria for classification as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Pennsylvania law. The SOAB ultimately concluded that the defendant should be classified as an SVP, and the trial court agreed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced the defendant to 60 to 120 months’ incarceration as well as lifetime sex offender registration. The defendant appealed.

The Superior Court’s Decision

On appeal, the defendant argued that he should not have to register as a sex offender pursuant to SORNA because he had committed the crimes as a juvenile. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously ruled in the case of In re J.B. that juvenile offenders have a protected right to reputation which is encroached on by SORNA’s presumption of recidivism, the presumption is not universally true, and there are alternative means for ascertaining the likelihood of reoffending. Therefore, requiring juveniles to register based solely on the offense of adjudication violates the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court also held that the application of SORNA’s current lifetime registration requirement upon adjudication of specified offenses violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing an irrebuttable presumption. Following J.B., the Superior Court ruled in Commonwealth v. Haines that the PA Supreme Court’s holding should apply with equal weight to a defendant convicted as an adult for crimes committed as a juvenile.

In this case, however, the Superior Court affirmed the sentenced registration requirements. The court rejected the defendant’s argument based on J.B. and Haines that the lifetime reporting requirements, for acts committed as a juvenile, under SORNA violated his due process rights by “utilizing an irrebuttable presumption” of a high likelihood of recidivism, even though that presumption is not “universally true.” The court accepted the Commonwealth’s argument that while it is unconstitutional to require lifetime SORNA reporting for “delinquent acts” committed by a juvenile even if later convicted and sentenced as an adult, the specific crime the defendant committed which led to his SVP classification did not qualify as a “delinquent act” under the Juvenile Act. The Court based its decision on the rationale that the Pennsylvania State Legislature specifically excluded certain crimes committed by juveniles from classification as “delinquent acts” because there are crimes that are so heinous that they require individuals to be tried as adults. The Court further reasoned that SVP classification is not a punitive measure designed to punish defendants; instead, it is a safety measure designed and applied to protect the community at large.

The Impact of Asbury

The Court’s ruling highlights the importance of the specific statutory language in Pennsylvania’s laws. In many cases, criminal charges are not brought until long after the acts have been committed, and sometimes convictions occur for adults who committed these crimes as juveniles. Just because an act is committed by a juvenile does not mean the act qualifies as a “delinquent act,” affording the individual certain protections that they would have had had they been charged sooner. Certain crimes committed by juveniles are always essentially adult crimes and may result in adult consequences.

At the same time, most sex offenses committed as a juvenile for which someone can be prosecuted as an adult do not trigger SORNA registration under Haines. In order for a court to impose a registration requirement on an adult who has been prosecuted for an offense they committed as a juvenile, either 1) the offense must have been committed with a deadly weapon, 2) the defendant must have had a prior serious sex offense, or 3) the court must find the defendant to be a sexually violent predator. Otherwise, the defendant should not have to register.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 7/20/23 Zak Goldstein 7/20/23

PA Superior Court: Defendant Must Show Link Between Case and Trial Judge's Subsequent Arrest in Order to Win New Evidence PCRA

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein,

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Myers, holding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s PCRA petition because the defendant failed to show that unrelated corruption by the trial judge tainted the conviction in his case. Myers shows the importance of actually linking subsequent misconduct by police and court officials to the defendant’s individual case. Where the defendant can show only that the police or judge did something wrong that was unrelated to the case, the defendant is unlikely to prevail in PCRA litigation.

The Facts of Myers

Myers pleaded guilty to third-degree murder. Pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, he received a sentence of 20 – 40 years’ incarceration. His co-defendant also pleaded guilty and received a shorter sentence. Two or three years later, the trial judge resigned from the bench because he had been caught stealing drugs from an evidence room in the courthouse. The judge pleaded guilty to related crimes, and the Supreme Court permanently disbarred him.

About seven years later, Myers filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition arguing that he should receive a new trial as a result of the judge’s corruption. Myers invoked the newly discovered evidence exception. Ordinarily, a PCRA petition must be filed within a year of a defendant’s sentence becoming final. There is an exception, however, for when a defendant uncovers new evidence which could not have been discovered prior to trial through the exercise of due diligence and that evidence calls the validity of the conviction in to doubt. In that case, the statute allows the defendant a new one year window in which to file a PCRA petition and seek a new trial based on the new evidence.

Here, the judge resigned from the bench in 2012 and was convicted in 2015. The defendant, however, did not file his PCRA petition until 2022. He claimed that he did not learn of the judge’s corruption until shortly before he filed his petition because he did not have access to many resources while in prison.

The trial court denied the petition. It found that 1) the judge’s conviction had been a matter of public record since at least 2015, so the defendant should have filed a petition within the 60 day deadline for new evidence that applied at the time, 2) the defendant admitted in his petition that he found out about the conviction in March 2021 but did not file the petition within the old 60 day deadline, and 3) the defendant failed to link the judge’s conviction to his own case or show how the judge’s drug theft and issues affected his ability to accept the negotiated guilty plea. The defendant appealed.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court affirmed the denial of the PCRA petition. The Court rejected the trial court’s first two reasons but accepted the third. Specifically, the defendant was not required to file anything within 60 days of the conviction becoming public because the public records presumption no longer applies. Recognizing that inmates do not necessarily have access to the news or legal databases, the Supreme Court eliminated the presumption that inmates are aware of public records like court documents in a case called Commonwealth v. Small in 2020. Therefore, the defendant was not expected to know about the judge’s conviction or resignation.

Second, a PCRA based on newly discovered evidence must be filed within a year based on a 2018 amendment that extended the deadline from 60 days to one year. As the trial court denied the petition for not having been filed within 60 days, the Superior Court found that the trial court erred for that reason, as well. The court simply failed to recognize the amendment to the law.

The Superior Court affirmed on the third reason, however. The Court found that the defendant failed to show that anything about the judge’s illegal behavior tainted his own case. The defendant had accepted a negotiated guilty plea, meaning he agreed to plead guilty and that he and the Commonwealth would recommend the same sentence to the judge. The judge accepted that negotiated plea. Thus, even if the judge had significant corruption or personal issues, there was nothing about those issues that would have affected the guilty plea or the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. In other words, the defendant was unable to show that anything about the judge’s behavior actually affected the case.

Finally, although the Court did not apply the old public records presumption, it did express skepticism that the defendant would not have heard about the judge’s behavior for so long. Although the presumption no longer applies, a defendant must be able to plead and prove that they acted with due diligence and could not reasonably have learned of the new evidence sooner. Here, the defendant failed to do so. Therefore, the Court affirmed the denial of the petition.

The Impact of Myers

The Court’s ruling shows the importance of linking a judge or police officer’s misconduct to the defendant’s specific case. In many cases, detectives or police officers get arrested long after a defendant has been found guilty and sentenced. In those cases, the arrest is often not the officer’s first incident of misconduct, and the Commonwealth and/or police may have had information in their files as to other acts of misconduct that should have been disclosed prior to trial. In that case, it may be possible to invoke the newly discovered evidence exception and allege a Brady violation. In other cases, there may not have been anything that the Commonwealth should have disclosed at the time, but the misconduct may have been so similar to something that happened in the defendant’s case that it calls the legitimacy of the defendant’s conviction into question. For example, if a witness claimed that the police coerced them into giving a statement and the officer involved is later disciplined for doing something similar, it may be possible to argue that the behavior is so similar that it should allow for a new trial under the newly discovered evidence exception.

Ultimately, the mere fact of a subsequent arrest or disciplinary action against someone involved in the case does not automatically result in a new trial. When a detective, judge, or prosecutor gets arrested after someone has been convicted, it is critical to understand when the exception applies and when it does not. It is also important to re-investigate the case thoroughly in order to establish any possible links between the misconduct and the defendant’s case.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Zak Goldstein 7/6/23 Zak Goldstein 7/6/23

PA Supreme Court: Parole Agents May Add Conditions of Supervision, Probation Officers May Not

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Koger, holding that the statutes governing state parole differ from those governing probation and allow parole agents to add conditions of supervision that were not included as part of the original sentencing order. This means that in some ways, probation provides more protections than parole. A probationer may not be convicted of violating probation conditions which were not ordered by the sentencing judge on the record at the time of sentencing, but a parolee may be found in violation of parole for violating conditions which were later imposed by the supervising parole agent.

The Facts of Koger

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and criminal use of a communications facility. The charges stemmed from an incident in which his daughter found contraband images on his cell phone. He pleaded guilty in state court and received a sentence of 8 - 23 months’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation. The court also ordered him to have no contact with any of the victims or persons displayed in the images, to submit to a drug and alcohol evaluation, to complete any recommended treatment, perform 100 hours of community service, and complete sexual offender counseling.

The court did not advise the defendant of the general conditions of probation or parole at the time of sentencing. Instead, a probation officer explained the general conditions of Washington County, PA’s probation and parole immediately following the sentencing hearing. None of those conditions were put on the record or placed in the sentencing order.

As the defendant had already served the minimum sentence, the court immediately paroled him. A few weeks later, the defendant violated his parole by possessing pornographic images. The trial court revoked his parole and sentenced him to his back time with work release for the parole violation. It resentenced him to another three years’ probation to run consecutively on the CUCF charge.

Following his release, the Commonwealth again charged him with violating his probation and/or parole. This time, the Commonwealth alleged that he violated some of the conditions of probation and parole which were not put on the record at the time of sentencing but were instead explained by the probation officer following sentencing. For example, the Commonwealth charged him with failing to report and consent to searches, violating criminal laws, committing assaultive, threatening, or harassing behavior, and failing to avoid unlawful and disreputable places.

Ultimately, the alleged violations stemmed from an incident in which the probation officers conducted a home visit and asked to search the defendant’s home. He refused to let them search the phone, they had to use force to detain him, and when they searched the phone, they found explicit chats between the defendant and a user who identified themselves as a 15-year-old female. They also found more illegal pornography. Finally, the defendant also threatened the probation officer as the officer dropped him off at the jail.

The trial court found that the defendant violated his parole and probation by committing technical violations. It revoked both the probation and parole and sentenced him to his back time for the parole violation and 1 - 3 years’ incarceration for the probation violation.

The defendant appealed, challenging both the legality of the sentence and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation of probation and parole. The Superior Court remanded, finding that the record did not contain sufficient evidence as to whether the conditions of probation and parole were made part of the sentencing order and proceeding. The trial court issued a supplemental opinion conceding that the conditions were not part of the sentencing proceedings. The Superior Court therefore reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court could not find the defendant in violation of probation and/or parole conditions which were not imposed at the time of sentencing. The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accepted the appeal.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Supreme Court previously ruled in Commonwealth v. Foster that conditions of probation must be made part of the record at sentencing or a defendant cannot be charged with violating them. The issue in this case, however, was whether the same rules apply to a potential parole violation or whether parole agents/officers may impose conditions after sentencing. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth, finding that parole is different from probation and parole agents may add their own conditions even where the trial court has not specifically included those conditions in the sentencing order or put them on the record.

When it comes to probation, the statute directs that the court shall attach reasonable conditions . . . as it deems necessary to assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life. A sentencing court may impose somewhat general conditions and then leave it to the probation officers to provide more specifics, but the basic conditions must be imposed by the sentencing court.

The statute, however, does not mention parole. Instead, the only relevant statute directs that when imposing a county sentence, the sentencing court shall place the inmate in the charge of and under the supervision of a designated probation officer. Therefore, the probation officer may decide the conditions of supervision during county parole.

State parole is also different as the Prisons and Parole Code authorizes the Parole Board to make general rules for the conduct of parolees and establish special conditions for supervision. The parole statute specifically authorizes the board to establish the conditions of supervision. Thus, the statutes require the sentencing judge to decide the conditions for probation, but it allows much more discretion to a state parole agent or county parole officer.

Therefore, the trial court properly found the defendant in violation of his county parole even though the conditions were imposed by a probation officer rather than the court. The probation violation was illegal, however, because the conditions for probation were not decided by the judge. This results in significant differences between probation and parole. For parole, the parole agent or officer may decide the conditions of supervision. But for probation, any conditions must be placed on the record at the time of sentencing.