Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 10/25/24 Zak Goldstein 10/25/24

PA Supreme Court: After Samia, Commonwealth Still May Not Use Non-Testifying Co-Defendant’s Confession Against Defendant Where Confession Obviously Implicates Defendant Contextually

Criminal Defense Lawyer Philadelphia — Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jones, holding that even despite the United States Supreme Court’s limiting of Bruton in Samia v. United States, the Commonwealth still may not use a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession against the defendant where the co-defendant’s confession either directly refers to the defendant even if not by name or the jury learns that the co-defendant’s confession has been redacted. This case is extremely important because some courts have suggested that Bruton was effectively overruled by the 2023 Samia decision, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has now held that Bruton is still implicated even when the defendant’s actual name is removed from the co-defendant’s statement.

The Facts of Jones

On February 6, 2016, at about 3:30 a.m., Jones, co-defendant #1, and co-defendant #2 exited a Philadelphia SEPTA train and hailed a cab driven by the victim. Jones took the front seat and, after directing Destin on where to drive, unexpectedly pulled a gun and shot the victim in the head. Jones jumped out of the cab while co-defendant #1 also assaulted the victim. The victim managed to escape with gunshot injuries. The incident was captured on SEPTA surveillance cameras, and police subsequently identified the three through tips from the restaurant owner where Jones and co-defendant #1 worked. Prosecutors charged Jones with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and firearms violations.

The Co-Defendant’s Confession

The main issue in the case came from co-defendant #1’s confession to the police. In his confession, co-defendant #1 referred directly to Jones by name as the shooter. At trial, however, the prosecution redacted the statement to change any references to Jones by name to “my friend” so as to comply with the Bruton rule. The co-defendant described the events leading up to the cab shooting. He specifically detailed how he and “his friend” left their workplace at Jack’s Firehouse Restaurant, traveled together, and were ultimately identified in SEPTA surveillance footage. He further explained that “his friend,” wearing a gray jacket, was seated in the front passenger seat of the cab and was the shooter.

Jones’s defense attorney argued that even though the co-defendant’s confession was redacted to replace Jones’s name with “my friend,” the confession still unmistakably pointed to him. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argued that the redactions were sufficient to meet Bruton’s requirements, especially in light of Samia’s more limited holding on whether a redacted confession which does nothing more than eliminate the defendant’s name solves any Sixth Amendment confrontation clause problems.

Ultimately, the issue involved in the use of a non-testifying co-defendant’s statement that implicates the defendant is that the defendant does not get the chance to cross-examine the non-testifying co-defendant. Accordingly, the use of such a confession, where it implicates the defendant, violates the Sixth Amendment’s right to confront one’s accusers. Courts have “solved” this problem by requiring the prosecution to redact these confessions and remove the defendant’s name. But the issue of whether redactions are sufficient where the statement still obviously refers to the defendant despite the redactions continues to come up.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the statement violated the Sixth Amendment because it was still painfully obvious that “my friend” was Jones. The ruling addressed two main questions: (1) whether the redactions sufficiently protected Jones’s Confrontation Clause rights, and (2) whether the use of contextual evidence rendered the redactions meaningless, thereby violating Bruton. The Court analyzed three prior United States Supreme Court cases in its opinion.

First, in Bruton v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission of a non-testifying codefendant's confession that implicates a defendant violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights if the codefendant does not testify. The rationale is that even with a limiting instruction, jurors may still use the confession against the defendant.

Second, in Gray v. Maryland the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that replacing a defendant’s name with an obvious blank or “deleted” was still a violation of Bruton as it creates an obvious reference to the defendant. Gray clarified that redactions must go beyond superficial omissions and avoid any obvious link to the defendant’s identity.

More recently, in Samia v. United States, the United States Supreme Court limited the protections of the Bruton rule. The 2023 Samia decision clarified that Bruton applies only to confessions that directly implicate the defendant. Samia held that if a confession uses neutral, non-identifiable language without directly naming or clearly pointing to the defendant, it is admissible, even if circumstantial evidence might suggest involvement. Samia does not really explain how much circumstantial or contextual evidence is too much such that even a redacted confession could violate the Sixth Amendment.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the fact that co-defendant #1’s confession, despite using “my friend” instead of Jones’s name, contained unmistakable identifiers that rendered the redaction ineffective under Bruton.

First, the confession was read to the jury by a detective, who noted that co-defendant #1 and “his friend” worked at Jack’s Firehouse Restaurant and were seen together on SEPTA surveillance footage. The confession described specific, identifying details:

Workplace Identification: The co-defendant described how he and “his friend” worked at Jack’s Firehouse and left their shift together. The Commonwealth brought in a witness from the restaurant who testified that Jones and co-defendant worked together at that establishment, providing a direct link for jurors.
Clothing and Physical Identification: The confession referenced Jones as “my friend” in a grey jacket, which was visually corroborated by SEPTA still images shown to the jury before the confession was read. The images showed Jones in a grey jacket.
The Incident in the Cab: The co-defendant described his “friend” pulling out a gun and shooting the cab driver, offering a narrative that aligned closely with Jones’s alleged crime, making it painfully apparent who the “friend” was.
Repeated Reference to the Redacted Statement: The prosecutor emphasized that the statement being read was “redacted” or altered. This, the Court concluded, likely drew the jury’s attention to the identity being shielded, potentially inviting them to infer that Jones was “my friend.”

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that, taken together, these contextual clues allowed the jury to identify Jones as “my friend” in the co-defendant’s confession, thereby violating Bruton even under Samia’s narrower standard. The ruling highlights that:

Direct Implication via Redaction: The confession’s references to Jones's workplace, his visible presence in surveillance footage, and specific references to the “friend” in a grey jacket uniquely identified Jones. This violated Bruton’s protection against statements that “directly” implicate a defendant.
Indirect Inference Insufficient for Admissibility: Although Samia permitted some level of inference, the Court found that the co-defendant’s description was so detailed that it effectively negated the redaction. The Court rejected the idea that replacing “Jones” with “my friend” avoided a Confrontation Clause issue at least in part because the jury knew of the redaction, which could make them more likely to infer the protected identity.
Distinguishing from Samia: Unlike in Samia, where a neutral reference did not clearly identify the defendant, here, the “gray jacket” and “workplace” identifiers pointed directly to Jones. This direct identification required no “linkage” with external evidence; rather, it was an immediate inference the jury could make without additional information.

The Court remanded the case for the Superior Court to determine if this Bruton violation constituted a harmless error, leaving room for possible further appellate consideration.

This case is critically important as it recognizes that the Bruton rule still has some viability in Pennsylvania state court proceedings. Simply replacing a defendant’s name with some other term such as my friend or the other guy is not enough where the confession makes it completely obvious to whom the confession refers.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 10/8/24 Zak Goldstein 10/8/24

Attorney Goldstein Wins New Trial For Client Who Served 18 Years for Wrongful Attempted Murder Conviction

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won a new trial for a client who served 18 years for a wrongful conviction for attempted murder. In 2006, the client, R.C., was arrested and charged along with three others for participating in shooting at an alleged rival from the neighborhood. The shots missed and struck a young child, seriously injuring him. R.C. and his co-defendants were charged with various counts of attempted murder and firearms offenses. The entire case depended on the testimony of one eyewitness who repeatedly told significantly different versions of the events. All four defendants proceeded by way of jury trial, and the jury convicted three of them. One of the four was acquitted by the Philadelphia jury.

About eight years later, one of the co-defendants filed and litigated a successful Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition alleging that his trial lawyer provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately prove that he could not have done the shooting because he was on video at the Gallery at the time of the shooting. The trial lawyer had introduced some of the video evidence at trial, but the trial lawyer had not obtained phone location data and receipts which further corroborated that that co-defendant could not have been there because he was in fact shopping miles away during the incident. The trial judge was eventually required by the Superior Court to grant that defendant a new trial, and the Commonwealth elected not to proceed with re-trying him.

Unfortunately, the co-defendant’s successful alibi exoneration did not result in any relief for R.C. or the other co-defendant who remains in custody. Fortunately, re-investigation of the case led to two leads in R.C.’s attempt to obtain justice. First, a review of the police file revealed the existence of a handwritten note which showed that police had five suspects from the beginning rather than the four that the sole eyewitness testified to. Further, the handwritten note actually had writing on it which suggested that R.C. never even fired a gun. This note was never provided to the defense. Second, the main eyewitness agreed to speak with an investigator, and she recanted her testimony. She ultimately said that she suspected R.C. may have been out there and part of the shooting because the fourth shooter wore all black, which R.C. was known to do, and had a similar build, but she was not sure that she had actually seen his face. Instead, she asserted that her husband had convinced her to say that it was R.C. who did the shooting even though she was not 100% sure that he was involved.

Armed with this new evidence, Attorney Goldstein filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition alleging that the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the note to the defense and that the recantation qualified as after discovered evidence which required a new trial. The PCRA court conducted a full day evidentiary hearing to hear from various witnesses from the defense and the Commonwealth. The judge found the recanting witness credible and after 18 years, finally granted R.C. a new trial.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 9/28/24 Zak Goldstein 9/28/24

PA Supreme Court Finds No Right to Bail in First Degree Murder Cases

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Yard, finding that a defendant does not have the right to bail in a first-degree murder case no matter how weak the case.

The Facts of Yard

In Yard, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder after the August 2021 death of his infant son. The child suffered fatal blunt-force trauma while under the defendant’s care. Adding to the suspicion, the child also had broken ribs from weeks prior to his death. In April 2022, Yard was formally charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of children. A Magisterial District Judge conducted a preliminary arraignment and held Yard in jail without bail pending trial.

Yard filed a motion for bail to be set. He argued that under the Supreme Court’s prior case of Commonwealth v. Talley, he was entitled to bail even though he was charged with first-degree murder. In Talley, the Supreme Court held that for bail to be denied based on dangerousness, the Commonwealth must essentially prove that it has a strong case. Yard argued that the Commonwealth’s case was not strong. He conceded that there was enough evidence for a lesser charge, such as involuntary manslaughter, but argued that the evidence did not support the specific intent necessary for a first-degree murder charge, which carries a potential life sentence.

During a bail hearing in May 2022, the Commonwealth presented evidence, including an autopsy report and the testimony of two forensic pathologists, supporting their case against Yard. The trial court agreed with Yard and set bail at $200,000 with non-monetary conditions. The Commonwealth moved for a stay and appealed. The Superior Court granted the stay and asked the trial court to explain why it granted bail.

In response, the trial court admitted that its decision relied on stipulated facts and not live testimony. Talley generally requires the Commonwealth to present some real evidence at the bail hearing in order to have a defendant held without bail, so the trial court held a new bail hearing. Yard also moved for nominal bail because he had been held for six months prior to trial in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(b). The trial court granted his motion and set bail at $1.

The Impact of Talley

In Commonwealth v. Talley, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized that defendants generally should not be held without bail based on potential dangerousness without real evidence. The Court recognized three specific exceptions to the right to bail:

Capital Offenses - When the accused is charged with an offense for which the death penalty is a potential sentence, the accused is not entitled to bail.
Life Imprisonment Offenses - When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by life imprisonment, the accused is not entitled to bail.
Dangerousness Exception - When no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment will reasonably assure the safety of any person or the community, the defendant is not entitled ot bail.

The crux of Talley was the interpretation of the "proof is evident or presumption great" standard, which required an evidentiary threshold somewhere between probable cause and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court concluded that this standard applied specifically to the dangerousness exception, placing a significant burden on the Commonwealth to justify bail denial by showing that it was substantially more likely than not that the accused posed an imminent threat and that no conditions of release could mitigate that threat.

The Talley decision emphasized that bail courts must engage in both a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the evidence to evaluate whether an individual’s release would endanger public safety. Importantly, the Court highlighted that the burden of both production and persuasion fall on the Commonwealth and that the Commonwealth may not simply rely on hearsay and assert that the case is serious and the defendant is dangerous. Instead, before holding someone without bail, a trial court must hold a real hearing and receive actual evidence of dangerousness and on how strong the Commonwealth’s case is.

The Issue in Yard

In Yard, the issue was whether Talley’s requirement that the Commonwealth prove dangerousness and introduce real evidence at a bail hearing also applies in a first-degree murder case given that a conviction for first-degree murder requires at least a sentence of life without parole. Yard argued that Talley applied, while the Commonwealth argued that it did not.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument. It found that the "proof is evident or presumption great" standard only applies to the dangerousness exception and not to cases involving capital offenses or offenses carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. This means that for offenses like first-degree murder, which are punishable by life imprisonment, bail can be categorically denied without the need for the extensive evidentiary showing that would be required when the Commonwealth argues for the dangerousness exception. Accordingly, although Talley seemed to suggest that bail may be available even in first-degree murder cases, the state Supreme Court has now held that defendants charged with first-degree murder may not be released on bail.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 8/12/24 Zak Goldstein 8/12/24

PA Superior Court: Causing Fatal Accident While Drunk Driving May Be Third Degree Murder

Commonwealth v. Peters

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Kevin Peters, holding that the trial court properly convicted the defendant of third degree murder for killing two people while driving drunk. The holding in this case conflicts with numerous cases of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in which the Court has held that drunk driving normally does not show the malice necessary to sustain a third degree murder conviction. Nonetheless, an en banc panel of the Superior Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction in this case.

The Facts of Peters

The evidence at trial showed that on December 6, 2019, after an evening of heavy drinking, the defendant decided to drive home from Philadelphia, despite being significantly impaired. He had attended an open-bar event at Ruth’s Chris Steak House, followed by visits to two other bars, where he continued to consume alcohol. The defendant rejected offers for alternative transportation from co-workers and chose to drive, even though he was visibly intoxicated.

The Commonwealth’s evidence suggested that the defendant was very drunk. He appears to have exhibited highly dangerous driving behavior, including speeding, swerving, and making abrupt lane changes without signaling on Interstate 95. He even had trouble paying to exit the parking garage and instead pushed the gate up himself, damaging it. Multiple drivers reported his erratic driving to 911. At approximately 1:00 AM, while traveling at a speed of 115 miles per hour, Peters rear-ended a van on I-95, causing it to catch fire. Two passengers in the van were killed. Two other occupants of the van survived but suffered serious injuries.

The Trial

The defendant was arrested and charged with murder, homicide by DUI, and related charges. The jury convicted him of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and other charges. His defense had focused primarily on the idea that he should not be convicted of murder because ordinary drunk driving, without more, even when it results in a fatal accident, does not show the mens rea of malice necessary for a third degree murder conviction. Myriad other serious charges would apply, but murder arguably would not. The jury rejected that defense and convicted him, and he received a lengthy state sentence. He appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

Peters appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Court went en banc to hear the case, meaning that nine judges decided to hear it instead of a normal panel of three. On appeal, Peters challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly the finding of "malice" necessary to sustain the convictions for third-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Superior Court affirmed. The court rejected Peters’s arguments, finding that his conduct demonstrated malice, which is a "conscious disregard for an unjustified and extremely high risk" to human life. The court highlighted the following aggravating factors:

The defendant's high level of intoxication, with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.151%.
His decision to drive at extreme speeds, peaking at 115 miles per hour, despite being aware of his impairment.
His failure to brake until less than half a second before impact.
The extended period of reckless driving leading up to the crash, during which Peters nearly collided with other vehicles, was offered a ride home before he began to drive, and had trouble exiting the parking garage.

The court distinguished this case from other DUI-related cases by emphasizing that the defendant had multiple opportunities to recognize the risk he was creating but chose to continue his dangerous behavior. The court concluded that the defendant’s sustained recklessness and the extreme danger he posed justified the jury's finding of malice.

Notably, the lead opinion drew a dissent in which multiple judges joined. The dissent opined that the Commonwealth had shown no behavior which was not inherent in the crime of homicide by DUI or driving drunk in general, and so the Commonwealth had failed to show malice. Peters had also not been warned by anyone else - although other motorists had called 911, he did not know that they had called 911. The dissent also emphasized that as dangerous as drunk driving may be, the Supreme Court has generally held that drunk driving does not provide the evidence of malice necessary for murder. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may well grant review of this decision.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire