Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 7/19/24 Zak Goldstein 7/19/24

Attorney Goldstein again selected to Superlawyers Rising Stars list

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, has been selected to the 2024 Pennsylvania Superlawyers Rising Stars list. Each year, no more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are selected by the research team at Super Lawyers to receive this honor. Super Lawyers, part of Thomson Reuters, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The annual selections are made using a patented multiphase process that includes a statewide survey of lawyers, an independent research evaluation of candidates and peer reviews by practice area. The result is a credible, comprehensive and diverse listing of exceptional attorneys. The Super Lawyers lists are published nationwide in Super Lawyers magazines and in leading city and regional magazines and newspapers across the country. Super Lawyers magazines also feature editorial profiles of attorneys who embody excellence in the practice of law. For more information about Super Lawyers, visit SuperLawyers.com.

Read Attorney Goldstein’s Profile on Superlawyers.com

Zak Goldstein 7/12/24 Zak Goldstein 7/12/24

Smith v. Arizona: United States Supreme Court Holds Expert May Not Testify to Absent Lab Analyst’s Testing Results if Analyst Unavailable

The Supreme Court of the United States has decided the case of Smith v. Arizona. In Smith, the Court held that when an expert conveys an absent lab analyst’s statements to support their opinion, and those statements must be true in order for the opinion to be accurate, the statements are admitted as evidence for their truth. If the statements are also testimonial, then their admission is barred by the Confrontation Clause. However, the Court did not decide whether the statements in this case were definitively testimonial, instead remanding that issue to the state court for further consideration.

The Facts in Smith v. Arizona

In December 2019, law enforcement officers in Yuma County, Arizona, arrested Jason Smith inside a shed during the execution of a search warrant. The officers discovered a large quantity of suspected drugs and drug-related items, leading to Smith being charged with multiple drug offenses, including possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and cannabis for sale, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Smith pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.

During trial preparations, the State sent the seized items to the Department of Public Safety's crime lab for analysis, identifying Smith as the suspect and providing details of his charges. Analyst Elizabeth Rast conducted the tests and documented her findings in detailed notes and a signed report. Her report concluded that the items contained usable quantities of methamphetamine, marijuana, and cannabis.

Initially, the State intended for Rast to testify at Smith’s trial. However, Rast left the lab before the trial for unspecified reasons. Instead, the State called Greggory Longoni as a substitute expert to testify based on Rast’s records, although Longoni did not conduct any independent testing. Longoni’s testimony, which relied on Rast’s records, led to Smith’s conviction.

Smith appealed, arguing that Longoni’s testimony violated his Confrontation Clause rights because he was unable to cross-examine Rast, whose statements formed the basis of Longoni’s opinion. The Arizona State Court of Appeals affirmed Smith’s conviction, reasoning that an expert could testify to the substance of a non-testifying expert’s analysis if it formed the basis of their opinion.

Supreme Court's Analysis

The Supreme Court rejected the Arizona Court of Appeals' reasoning, focusing on whether Rast’s statements were introduced for their truth. The Court stated that if Rast’s statements were used to establish that the events documented in her report actually occurred, then they were admitted for their truth. Furthermore, the Court assumed that since the testing and records were made for evidentiary purposes, Rast’s statements were testimonial.

The Court emphasized that if an expert’s testimony conveys an out-of-court statement to support their opinion, and the statement supports the opinion only if true, then the statement is admitted for its truth. The inability to cross-examine the analyst themselves on the reliability of the testing and the expert’s reliance on that underlying testing leaves the jury with an unchallenged assumption of truth and the defense with no opportunity to challenge that assumption. This is exactly what the Confrontation Clause forbids.

The Takeaway

This is an important decision. Under prior precedent, the prosecution had been able to use substitute experts to testify to what other expert witnesses did. That procedure, however, leaves the defense completely unable to challenge the credibility of the actual people who did the testing. This decision reinforces the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them, ensuring the integrity and fairness of the judicial process.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case?

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 7/6/24 Zak Goldstein 7/6/24

PA Superior Court: Police May Temporarily Seize Gun in Plain View During Traffic Stop

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Hawkins-Davenport, holding that if the police see a gun in plain view during a traffic stop, they may temporarily seize and secure the gun during the stop. They may also ask the driver of the vehicle if they have a license to carry the gun.

The Facts of Hawkins-Davenport

Philadelphia Police Officers McCabe and Torres conducted a traffic stop of the defendant because his driver’s side brake light was not working. Officer Torres approached the passenger side of the car while his partner went to the driver’s side, and Officer Torres immediately saw a gun sitting on the passenger seat. Officer Torres reached into the car and took the gun. He then held onto it for the remainder of the stop, and he asked the defendant if the defendant had a license to carry the firearm. The defendant told him that the did not have a license, so the police arrested him. Philadelphia prosecutors charged the defendant with gun charges including carrying a firearm without a license in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106 and carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108.

The defendant moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the police illegally searched the car and seized the gun because they had no reason to believe that he was going to use the gun on them or that he possessed the gun illegally before they seized it. He also argued that his statement that he did not have a license to carry should be suppressed because the police seized the gun without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and questioned him without first giving him Miranda warnings. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, ruling that the traffic stop was legal but the police had no reason to seize the gun or question the defendant about it. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that Officer Torres's actions in securing the firearm were justified as a necessary precaution to ensure officer safety during the traffic stop. The prosecution contended that the trial court erred in suppressing the firearm and the defendant’s statements given the context of the situation in which the police did nothing more than secure the gun for officer safety purposes during a brief traffic stop.

The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth and reversed. The Court reviewed the transcripts and the body cam footage and agreed that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The Court also found that the officer had the right to secure the firearm that was in plain view during the traffic stop regardless of whether the gun was legally or illegally possessed. The Court noted that officers have the right to take reasonable precautions to ensure their safety during traffic stops. The Court referenced prior cases such as Commonwealth v. Ross and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, noting that securing a firearm observed in plain view is a reasonable safety measure. Further, the officers did not unlawfully extend the stop by asking just one question as to whether the defendant had a license to carry. Therefore, the trial court should not have granted the motion to suppress, and the Superior Court reversed.

In this case, the Superior Court approved of the officers’ actions because they were focused on officer safety, the gun was just out and sitting on the passenger seat, and the officers did not extend the stop by extensively questioning the defendant. They had the right to take quick action to secure the gun and ask a question about the legality of the gun. The result likely would have been different had the gun not been so obviously in plain view or had the police needed to significantly prolong the stop in order to question the defendant about firearms and firearms licenses.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 7/3/24 Zak Goldstein 7/3/24

PA Superior Court: Institutional Sexual Assault Statute Does Not Apply to Colleges

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Yanovitsky, reversing the defendant’s conviction for institutional sexual assault after concluding that that statute does not apply to colleges and universities.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was a professor at a large state university in Philadelphia. The complainant testified that after class, he dismissed all of the other students, leaving her alone with him in the classroom. He then touched her hair, kissed her forehead, and pressed his penis against her thigh. He also touched her feet and hands, and she said that she did not consent. Her roommate testified that the complainant immediately reported the incident to her and had expressed her concerns about some prior behavior by the same professor. DNA testing revealed the presence of the defendant’s DNA on the complainant’s clothing, but character witnesses testified to the defendant’s good reputation in the community.

The police arrested the defendant, and Philadelphia prosecutors charged him with institutional sexual assault and indecent assault. The jury convicted, and the defendant appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Superior Court reversed the institutional sexual assault conviction and affirmed the indecent assault conviction. The Court therefore remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.

On appeal, the defendant argued that institutional sexual assault, which is a new offense in Pennsylvania, does not apply to colleges and universities despite the extremely broad language of the statute.

The Superior Court agreed. The Court reversed the institutional sexual assault conviction of primarily because it found that the statute under which he was convicted did not apply to college or university settings.

First, the Court interpreted the statutory language of the institutional sexual assault statute (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.2) and concluded that it was intended to protect students in elementary and secondary schools, not those in higher education institutions.

The statute defines “school” to include public or private schools, intermediate units, or area vocational-technical schools. The Court noted that these definitions typically refer to institutions providing education for children and adolescents, not adults in colleges or universities.

The Court looked at dictionary definitions and legal interpretations of the word “school.” Although Merriam-Webster’s definition included colleges and universities, Black’s Law Dictionary and other legal sources suggested that the term “school” in a statute usually refers to institutions for children unless the statute explicitly includes higher education institutions.

The Court also looked at the legislative history and context of the statute. It found that the statute was aimed at protecting younger students from employees and adults in schools. The Governor’s message accompanying amendments to the statute highlighted its focus on protecting children from sexual predators. Additionally, the absence of terms specifically referring to higher education (such as “professor,” “college,” or “university”) in the statute further supported the interpretation that the statute was not meant to cover colleges and universities.

The Court also found that applying the statute to colleges would lead to an absurd result. The Court considered the potential consequences of interpreting the statute to include higher education. It pointed out that if “school” included colleges and universities, any consensual sexual relationship between a college professor and an adult student would be criminalized, which the legislature likely did not intend, especially in cases where the adult student was not even a student of the professor.

Finally, the Superior Court noted that the Commonwealth agreed with the defendant’s argument that the statute did not apply to college or university settings and conceded that his conviction for institutional sexual assault should be vacated.

Therefore, the Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. This case illustrates the fact that although the statute is broad, it does not apply to absolutely everyone in any kind of school setting. Instead, the statute only applies to certain types of schools and to certain employees and other adults in those settings who have “direct contact” as defined by the statute. It does not apply to all employees and all possible types of schools.