Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 8/12/24 Zak Goldstein 8/12/24

PA Superior Court: Causing Fatal Accident While Drunk Driving May Be Third Degree Murder

Commonwealth v. Peters

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Kevin Peters, holding that the trial court properly convicted the defendant of third degree murder for killing two people while driving drunk. The holding in this case conflicts with numerous cases of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in which the Court has held that drunk driving normally does not show the malice necessary to sustain a third degree murder conviction. Nonetheless, an en banc panel of the Superior Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction in this case.

The Facts of Peters

The evidence at trial showed that on December 6, 2019, after an evening of heavy drinking, the defendant decided to drive home from Philadelphia, despite being significantly impaired. He had attended an open-bar event at Ruth’s Chris Steak House, followed by visits to two other bars, where he continued to consume alcohol. The defendant rejected offers for alternative transportation from co-workers and chose to drive, even though he was visibly intoxicated.

The Commonwealth’s evidence suggested that the defendant was very drunk. He appears to have exhibited highly dangerous driving behavior, including speeding, swerving, and making abrupt lane changes without signaling on Interstate 95. He even had trouble paying to exit the parking garage and instead pushed the gate up himself, damaging it. Multiple drivers reported his erratic driving to 911. At approximately 1:00 AM, while traveling at a speed of 115 miles per hour, Peters rear-ended a van on I-95, causing it to catch fire. Two passengers in the van were killed. Two other occupants of the van survived but suffered serious injuries.

The Trial

The defendant was arrested and charged with murder, homicide by DUI, and related charges. The jury convicted him of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and other charges. His defense had focused primarily on the idea that he should not be convicted of murder because ordinary drunk driving, without more, even when it results in a fatal accident, does not show the mens rea of malice necessary for a third degree murder conviction. Myriad other serious charges would apply, but murder arguably would not. The jury rejected that defense and convicted him, and he received a lengthy state sentence. He appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

Peters appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Court went en banc to hear the case, meaning that nine judges decided to hear it instead of a normal panel of three. On appeal, Peters challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly the finding of "malice" necessary to sustain the convictions for third-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Superior Court affirmed. The court rejected Peters’s arguments, finding that his conduct demonstrated malice, which is a "conscious disregard for an unjustified and extremely high risk" to human life. The court highlighted the following aggravating factors:

The defendant's high level of intoxication, with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.151%.
His decision to drive at extreme speeds, peaking at 115 miles per hour, despite being aware of his impairment.
His failure to brake until less than half a second before impact.
The extended period of reckless driving leading up to the crash, during which Peters nearly collided with other vehicles, was offered a ride home before he began to drive, and had trouble exiting the parking garage.

The court distinguished this case from other DUI-related cases by emphasizing that the defendant had multiple opportunities to recognize the risk he was creating but chose to continue his dangerous behavior. The court concluded that the defendant’s sustained recklessness and the extreme danger he posed justified the jury's finding of malice.

Notably, the lead opinion drew a dissent in which multiple judges joined. The dissent opined that the Commonwealth had shown no behavior which was not inherent in the crime of homicide by DUI or driving drunk in general, and so the Commonwealth had failed to show malice. Peters had also not been warned by anyone else - although other motorists had called 911, he did not know that they had called 911. The dissent also emphasized that as dangerous as drunk driving may be, the Supreme Court has generally held that drunk driving does not provide the evidence of malice necessary for murder. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may well grant review of this decision.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 3/16/23 Zak Goldstein 3/16/23

PA Superior Court: Jail Time Required After Third Conviction for Driving on DUI Suspended License

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Rollins, holding that a defendant must be sentenced to six months’ incarceration for a third conviction for driving on a DUI suspended license under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b). The appellate courts had previously concluded that trial courts could not constitutionally sentence defendants to jail time for the first two convictions because the penalty sections of the statutes do not contain maximum possible sentences, making the statute unconstitutionally vague for the first two offenses. The third offense, however, is graded as a misdemeanor of the third degree, so a court may sentence a defendant to jail.

The Facts of Rollins

The defendant had his driver’s license suspended due to a DUI conviction. He was charged with driving on a DUI suspended license in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b) three times. He was convicted for the first two, but the case is not clear as to what sentence he received. In 2021, he was arrested and charged with the offense for a third time. He pleaded guilty, but he argued that he could not receive jail time because the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The trial court, however, sentenced him to six to twelve months’ incarceration. The statute provides:

(iii) A third or subsequent violation of this paragraph shall constitute a misdemeanor of the third degree and, upon conviction of this paragraph, a person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $2,500 and to undergo imprisonment for not less than six months.

The statute itself does not specify the maximum penalty, so the defendant argued that he could not receive jail time. Two appellate cases arguably supported his position. Specifically, in Commonwealth v. Eid, the defendant was convicted of the summary offense of DWS set forth at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i), which applied when an individual was found to be driving with a suspended or revoked license and refused a breath test. Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i) provided that an individual found in violation of this section “shall, upon first conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.” Eid was sentenced to a term of ninety days to six months’ imprisonment as well as a $1,000 fine.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the statute was “unconstitutionally vague and inoperable” as the provision failed to provide a maximum term of incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed Eid’s conviction and fine, but it vacated the imprisonment term as it declined to infer a maximum sentence, which would have forced the Court to “engage in sheer speculation as to which sentence the General Assembly intended.”

Shortly thereafter, in Commonwealth v. Jackson, the defendant pleaded guilty to the summary offense of DWS set forth at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii), which applied when an individual was found to have a second DWS violation. Section 1543(b)(1)(ii) provided “[a] second violation of this [crime] shall constitute a summary offense and, upon conviction [ ], a person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000[.00] and to undergo imprisonment for not less than 90 days.”

The Superior Court applied Eid and found that the section was unconstitutionally vague and inoperable because it contained identical language to that in Eid. The statute provided a mandatory minimum, but it provided no maximum, and the court could not guess as to what maximum the legislature intended. Therefore, the Jackson Court affirmed Jackson’s conviction and the imposition of the fine, but it vacated the house arrest portion of the sentence.

The Superior Court’s Decision

Here, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and rejected the defendant’s argument. The Court found that the statute properly provides both a minimum and a maximum. It states that the minimum sentence shall be six months’ incarceration, and it also defines the statute as a third degree misdemeanor. The crime code provides that third degree misdemeanors may be punished by up to a year in jail, and so the absence of the specific maximum in the statute itself does not make the statute unconstitutionally vague because the offense is defined as a third degree misdemeanor. Therefore, the Court found that the section was not like the flawed sections in Eid and Jackson that apply to first and second offenses. Barring any successful additional appeals, the defendant will have to serve the six to twelve month jail sentence.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 10/6/22 Zak Goldstein 10/6/22

PA Superior Court Reverses Itself and Finds ARD Counts as Prior Conviction in DUI Cases

An en banc Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Moroz, holding that proof of a prior acceptance of ARD counts as a prior offense for sentencing purposes in DUI cases. Notably, this decision overrules the recent panel decision in Commonwealth v. Chichkin which held that prior acceptance of ARD did not count for recidivist purposes.

Commonwealth v. Moroz - Does ARD Count As a Prior Offense in a DUI Case?

Police arrested the defendant for two DUIs on two separate dates. The defendant then entered the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program for his first DUI. The court deferred the defendant’s sentencing on other charges from his second arrest. Before sentencing could occur, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued its opinion on Chichkin, holding that a DUI offense where ARD was accepted could not be used to impose an increased sentence for subsequent DUI offenses.

During trial, the defendant objected to being sentenced as a recidivist based on his prior ARD offense, citing Chichkin. The Commonwealth argued that if it could prove the first DUI offense beyond a reasonable doubt in an evidentiary hearing at sentencing, then it could establish the second DUI was a second offense even though the defendant had received ARD. The Commonwealth then requested an evidentiary hearing to address whether it could prove the first DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. This request was denied. The trial court held the defendant’s sentencing hearing , and the trial court relied on Chichkin in sentencing the defendant as a first-time offender.

The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal, raising the issues of whether the defendant’s prior acceptance of ARD for his first DUI qualified as a prior offense and whether Chichkin should be overruled.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court reviewed relevant case law to make its decision, as well as the DUI gradation statute, Section 3806. Section 3806 specifically mentions that acceptance of ARD constitutes a prior offense. Additionally, other cases such as Commonwealth v. Whalen and Commonwealth v. Scheinert demonstrate that a defendant must voluntarily agree to ARD, indicate he understands the proceedings, and agree to comply with any conditions imposed by the court. The defendant is also presumed to be aware of Section 3806 when accepting ARD. The Superior Court acknowledged that acceptance of ARD does not contain the same procedural safeguards of a conviction following a trial, but it deemed the safeguards of ARD sufficient due to the “intensive process” of the ARD program. Additionally, Whalen states that ARD can be equated with a conviction only under certain circumstances, such as sentencing on subsequent convictions.

Therefore, the Superior Court overruled Chichkin, vacating the defendant’s judgement of sentence, and remanding for further proceedings. The defendant will now face a significantly increased mandatory minimum when he is sentenced as a second-time offender barring further appeals. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has accepted review of this issue, so this will not be the final word on whether ARD counts as a prior offense in DUI cases.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Criminal Defense Lawyers in Philadelphia — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

Zak Goldstein 7/27/22 Zak Goldstein 7/27/22

PA Supreme Court: Police Often Must Get Search Warrant to Obtain Homicide-by-DUI Defendant's Blood from Hospital

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, holding that the defendant’s blood was illegally seized for drug testing because the police obtained it from a hospital without getting a search warrant. The Commonwealth had attempted to use various statutes and theories to justify the warrantless seizure, but because no exigent circumstances were present which would justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court ruled that the police violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. The court therefore suppressed the blood results.

Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams

The defendant drove his car at about two miles per hour over train tracks, where a train collided with his vehicle. The train pushed it for a quarter of a mile before it stopped moving. The defendant and his daughter were transported to a hospital, while his fiancée who had also been in the car was pronounced dead at the scene.

Lieutenant Steven Lutz, the officer in charge, spoke to several individuals who explained that the defendant’s car smelled like burnt marijuana. Lieutenant Lutz told Sergeant Keith Farren to interview the defendant and obtain a legal blood draw. A legal blood draw requires consent or a search warrant from a subject before being seized for testing. Sergeant Farren determined that the defendant was not conscious enough to give consent, as he had been drifting in and out of consciousness. This would often justify a warrantless search under the Supreme Court’s case law, but prior to obtaining the blood, the officer learned that the hospital had already drawn the defendant’s blood.

Sergeant Farren completed paperwork authorizing the defendant’s blood to be tested, and it was revealed that the defendant’s blood contained Delta-9 THC, an ingredient in marijuana. The defendant was arrested and charged with homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, DUI: controlled substance – schedule I, II, or III metabolite, DUI: general impairment, careless driving, careless driving – unintentional death, aggravated assault while DUI, and aggravated assault by vehicle.

The defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the blood test results, arguing that the police did not have probable cause that he was driving under the influence, that his blood was seized without a warrant, and that Section 3755, which allows the police to obtain blood from a hospital without a warrant, did not justify the seizure.

Of note, Section 3755 states that if a person who is suspected to be DUI must seek medical treatment, then a physician must take blood samples from the individual and transmit them within 24 hours to the Department of Health or a laboratory for testing. These results then may be released to the individual tested, his attorney, his physician or government officials.

During the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Lutz testified that the defendant’s blood was obtained through a legal blood draw, citing Section 3755. Notably, Sergeant Farren never referenced Section 3755 during his testimony, instead explaining that he attempted to obtain the defendant’s blood through an implied consent form. Both officers acknowledged that they could have obtained a warrant for the defendant’s blood but did not do so.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, stating that the blood test results were admissible under the exigent circumstances exception. The defendant’s trial by jury commenced, and the Commonwealth admitted his blood test results. The defendant was found guilty of DUI offenses, homicide by vehicle, endangering the welfare of a child, recklessly endangering another person, aggravated assault while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle, and careless driving.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The defendant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence, but this motion was denied. He then appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his first motion to suppress evidence. He argued that the Commonwealth did not comply with Section 3755, that even if the Commonwealth had complied with Section 3755, this compliance alone is insufficient to overcome the warrant requirement, and that there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

In the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court concluded that the original finding of exigency was erroneous because there was no urgent need for Sergeant Farren to dispense with obtaining a search warrant for the seizure of the defendant’s blood test results. The Superior Court agreed with this opinion. As the hospital had already preserved the blood evidence, Sergeant Farren had plenty of time to obtain a warrant. The Superior Court concluded that the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted and remanded for a new trial.

The Supreme Court Appeal

The Commonwealth then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to address whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow legal precedent in holding that Section 3755 does not independently support implied consent and whether the Superior Court failed to properly apply and follow the legal precedent from Mitchell v. Wisconsin by finding that exigent circumstances did not exist to support a warrantless testing of the defendant’s blood. The Supreme Court granted allocatur and agreed to hear the appeal.

The Supreme Court ultimately decided with the defendant. The Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth’s Mitchell argument. In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court found that exigency almost always exists when the police need to obtain blood from an unconscious defendant because the defendant cannot be asked to consent and any controlled substances in the blood quickly begin to dissipate. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth argued that exigency was established due to probable cause that the defendant was driving under the influence of marijuana, he had to be transported to the hospital, he was not fully conscious, and he was unable to communicate with Sergeant Farren. The Commonwealth further agued that the police could not have applied for a search warrant as they had other duties to attend to regarding the crash and other emergencies.

The defendant argued that the police officers testified that they could have obtained a search warrant during his trial. The seizure occurred after the blood was drawn, meaning the blood had already been preserved and nothing would dissipate, but testing did not occur until three days later, demonstrating a lack of exigency.

The Supreme Court concluded that there was no exigency because there was very little chance that the blood evidence would be destroyed if the officers took time to obtain a search warrant. The blood evidence had been properly preserved in this case.

The Supreme Court also addressed the Commonwealth’s argument about Section 3755 and concluded that the Commonwealth did not adhere to the requirements of the statute. Sergeant Farren did not comply with Section 3755; specifically, in his paperwork to obtain the defendant’s blood, he invoked 75 Pa.S.C.A. 1547. He also sought the defendant out to obtain consent, which is not necessary when invoking Section 3755, and there was no mention during the trial that any emergency room personnel took the defendant’s blood due to adherence to Section 3755. The Supreme Court also vacated the portion of the Superior Court’s holding that Section 3755 was unconstitutional because it determined that Section 3755 did not legally apply to this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately found that police violated the defendant’s rights and that the blood evidence should be suppressed. It remanded the case for a new trial. Thus, where the hospital has already preserved a suspect’s blood, the police must get a search warrant prior to seizing that blood from the hospital. They may not rely on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

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