Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 4/3/22 Zak Goldstein 4/3/22

PA Superior Court: Phone Call About Possible Drunk Driving Did Not Justify Warrantless Search of Suspect's Home

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Edgin, holding that police officers illegally entered a defendant’s home under the guise of exigent circumstances. The officer’s based the warrantless search on the fact that bystanders had reported that the defendant may have been driving drunk prior to arriving home. It seems obvious that the officers should have obtained a search warrant prior to breaking into his home, and fortunately, the Superior Court agreed.

Commonwealth v. Edgin

A police officer in Centre County was dispatched to investigate a call about a possible intoxicated driver. Multiple 911 calls came in to dispatch concerning the driver. One of the 911 callers reported observing the individual driving a truck that was swerving in and out of its designated lane. The caller followed the truck and then observed the defendant exiting the vehicle and entering a residence through a garage door. When an officer arrived on scene, he observed a truck that matched the description given by the callers. This truck had some damage to it. Specifically, it had dents and scrapes, and it was missing a mirror. There was also a piece of wood shoved between the rim and the tire.

The officers attempted to make contact with the defendant. They went to the door of the house and announced themselves as officers. They knocked loudly on the front door and the rear sliding door multiple times with no response. The officers would later testify that they were concerned about the man’s well being and inquired about making entry into the residence. Additionally, although it is unclear from the opinion, one of the officers believed that the individual may have been diabetic, and this officer had prior experience with diabetic emergencies. Claiming a this prior experience and a purported belief that the individual may have needed medical assistance due to the damage on the truck, the officers decided to break into the house without a search warrant.

While inside the residence, the officers again announced themselves loudly and searched the house for the driver. They then came across the defendant asleep in a bedroom on the second floor of the residence. The officer testified that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and had to shake the male several times to wake up him. The officers then called for an ambulance. The defendant was taken back to the back of an ambulance where one of the 911 callers identified him as the driver. Additionally, the defendant was then advised of his Miranda rights, and he was subsequently interrogated. The defendant denied driving and that his truck was ever downtown. Police also took the defendant to the hospital for a blood draw.

Police arrested the defendant and charged him with DUI. The defendant then filed a motion to suppress, arguing that all evidence recovered from the defendant’s home and any evidence that resulted from the entry into his home should be suppressed because the officers entered his home without a warrant. At the motion to suppress hearing, the above facts were placed into the record. The trial court concluded that the there were exigent circumstances that justified the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home. Specifically, the trial court focused on the fact that the defendant was a known diabetic and that there were multiple 911 calls concerning this incident. Further, one of the 911 callers specifically witnessed the defendant exiting his truck and entering his residence. According the trial court, there were valid exigent circumstances present to justify the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home.

After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant proceeded by way of a non-jury trial. He was subsequently found guilty and he then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the officers entered his house without a warrant and that there were not valid exigent circumstances that allowed them to circumvent the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

When do exigent circumstances allow the police to enter a home without a warrant?

Police generally may not enter a home without a search warrant or exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances are basically an emergency. In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, a court should consider a number of factors. Those factors include:

1) the gravity of the offense;

2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;

3) whether there is above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause;

4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered;

5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended;

6) whether the entry was peaceable;

7) the time of the entry, i.e., whether it was made at night;

8) whether this involves a hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; 9) whether evidence is likely to be destroyed without a warrant; and

9) whether there is a anger to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.

These factors are to be balanced against one another in determining whether a warrantless intrusion was justified. Police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court. In making its decision the Superior Court analyzed the above-mentioned factors. First, the trial court found that because DUI is a misdemeanor offense, this severely weakened the officers’ right to enter the defendant’s home without a warrant. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant was armed, the defendant would have escaped if he had not been apprehended, or any injuries or property damage. Further, the Superior Court rejected the argument that the dissipation of alcohol in the defendant’s bloodstream constituted a “per se exigency” that permitted the officers to enter his home without a warrant.

Finally, the Superior Court also rejected the argument that the officers could enter the defendant’s house under the guise that they needed to provide medical assistance to him. The Superior Court noted that the defendant was able to drive himself home and then enter his home without assistance. The Superior Court specifically rejected the argument that a high degree of intoxication can create a medical emergency that allows the officers to enter a home without a warrant. As such, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the officers had a legitimate reason to enter his home to provide medical assistance. Therefore, the Superior Court held that there were no real exigencies that permitted the officers to enter the defendant’s home without a warrant. Consequently, his conviction will be vacated and the defendant will receive a new trial. The Commonwealth will also not be able to use the evidence it obtained from the illegal entry of the defendant’s residence at this trial.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 4/1/22 Zak Goldstein 4/1/22

Attorney Goldstein Wins New Trial in Superior Court Appeal of First Degree Murder Case

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. V.G., reversing that defendant’s conviction for first degree murder and the accompanying mandatory sentence of life without parole. In this case, the evidence introduced at trial showed that the defendant attended a house party. During the party, he was assaulted and robbed by a larger man. He pulled a gun and fired it, shooting and killing the man who had robbed him and shooting and injuring the friend of that man who was rapidly approaching him as if he too might have had a gun. The defendant testified at trial to the above facts and that he had acted in self-defense. Despite his testimony, the trial judge announced that he did not believe the defendant and refused to provide him with the jury instructions for self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to life without parole.

V.G. retained Attorney Goldstein and filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, Attorney Goldstein argued that the trial court had unfairly deprived V.G. of his entire defense by refusing to instruct the jury on the defenses of self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. The standard for whether a jury instruction relating to a defense should be provided to the jury is solely whether there is some evidence in the record that would support the instruction. In this case, the defendant had specifically testified to his actions and that he took them in self-defense, so there was at least some evidence in the record to support both defenses. The trial judge had erred in simply choosing not to believe the defendant, whereas the question of whether he was telling the truth should have gone to the jury.

The Superior Court agreed. It reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. V.G., who would have had to serve a life sentence for first degree murder, will now receive a new trial.

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Zak Goldstein 3/15/22 Zak Goldstein 3/15/22

PA Superior Court Strikes Down Mandatory Minimum For Driving On a DUI Suspended License

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jackson, holding that the sentencing provision in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii) (driving on a DUI suspended license) is unconstitutionally vague. This decision is significant because so many individuals, oftentimes unknowingly, violate this law on multiple occasions and therefore are subjected to the mandatory minimum of at least 90 days of imprisonment. This decision holds that this mandatory 90-day sentence is unconstitutional, and therefore countless individuals will no longer be subjected to it.

Commonwealth v. Jackson

The defendant was arrested under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii), which makes it a crime to drive while a person’s operating privileges is suspended or revoked as a result of a DUI or chemical testing refusing. The defendant pleaded guilty to this offense, but it was his second time violating this statute. Pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii), if a person has a prior conviction for this offense, then the person must “undergo imprisonment for not less than 90 days.” As such, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 90 days of house arrest and imposed a fine of $1,000.00. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that the sentencing component of the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the defendant relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Eid, which held that the sentencing provision in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i) (which is identical to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii)’s sentencing provision) was unconstitutionally vague because it did not provide a statutory maximum sentence for the offense. The defendant argued that this logic should apply to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii)’s sentencing provision and that it should also be held as unconstitutional.

What is 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii)?

75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii) provides:

(i) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when the person's operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or the former section 3731, because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for refusal) or 3802 or former section 3731 or is suspended under section 1581 (relating to Driver's License Compact) for an offense substantially similar to a violation of section 3802 or former section 3731 shall, upon a first conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days.
(ii) A second violation of this paragraph shall constitute a summary offense and, upon conviction of this paragraph, a person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for not less than 90 days.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the defendant and vacated the sentence. Notably, the trial court had also agreed with the defendant and in its opinion wrote that he received an illegal sentence because of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Eid. The Superior Court held that the sentencing provision that was found to be unconstitutional in Eid was “identical” to the sentencing provision in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii). Therefore, “because 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii) does not provide for a maximum term of incarceration, it is unconstitutionally vague and inoperable for the same reasons expressed in Eid.” Pennsylvania law requires that almost all sentences have both minimum and maximum terms. As this statute does not allow for a maximum sentence that is different from the minimum, it was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court vacated the defendant’s sentence, and he will receive a new hearing at which no mandatory minimum will apply.

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Zak Goldstein 2/25/22 Zak Goldstein 2/25/22

PA Superior Court: Sexually Violent Predator Determination May Not Be Made Based on Hearsay

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Aumick, holding that the Commonwealth may not use hearsay alone to prove that a defendant should be designated as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) often requires defendants convicted of a sexually violent offense to be assessed on specific criteria to determine if they should be designated as an SVP. The court will then hold a hearing in order to determine the defendant’s status. In this case, the Superior Court rejected the proposition that the Commonwealth could rely only on hearsay testimony at an SVP hearing.

COMMONWEALTH V. AUMICK

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of corruption of minors, resulting in a sentence of 18 months to 5 years in prison. This conviction required an assessment to determine if the defendant should be designated as an SVP. The Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) assesses an individual with a criminal conviction. The assessment must consider a number of factors to determine if the individual has a mental abnormality or personality disorder that raises the likelihood of the individual engaging in sexually violent behavior. Such factors include whether the offense involved more than one victim; whether the individual exceeded necessary means to perform the offense; the nature of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the relationship between the defendant and the victim(s); the age of the victim(s); the extent of cruelty displayed by defendant during the offense; the defendant’s prior criminal history; whether the defendant fully completed prior sentence(s); whether the defendant participated in programs for sexual offenders; the defendant’s age; the defendant’s use of illicit drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental disability, mental illness, or other mental abnormality; any behavioral characteristics that relate to the defendant’s conduct; and any other factor that could relate to the defendant’s possibility of reoffending.

After the assessment is completed, the individual and district attorney receive of a hearing. The sentencing court must determine whether the Commonwealth can produce clear and convincing evidence that the individual should receive the designation of SVP at this hearing.

After the defendant’s guilty plea, the court ordered an assessment to determine whether the defendant should be designated as an SVP. Dr. Mary Muscari performed the assessment and concluded that defendant met the criteria. The report was sent to the Commonwealth, who forwarded a copy to the defendant and moved for a hearing.

The Commonwealth used Muscari’s testimony as the basis for their case. At the hearing, however, Muscari admitted that she considered only documents submitted by third parties. She testified that she formulated her opinion based on both the offense to which the defendant had pleaded guilty as well as the unproven allegations of the victim which were included in the charging documents. Muscari opined that the defendant had a pedophilic disorder, and he met the predatory criteria required due to the conduct he engaged in with his step-granddaughter. She claimed that the defendant was likely to reoffend even though the defendant had not committed prior sexual crimes.

Defense counsel counsel objected to Muscari’s opinion due to her claim that her assessment was partially based on allegations that to which the defendant did not plead guilty. Muscari also did not interview the defendant or the complainant for her assessment. Despite these objections, the trial court designated the defendant a sexually violent predator. Defense counsel appealed this decision, arguing the designation was based on hearsay related to allegations which were never proven because the defendant’s plea was not to all of the charges.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court’s SVP designation. The Court concluded that Commonwealth v. McClelland set the precedent that hearsay alone is not sufficient evidence for a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. If hearsay is not sufficient to hold a defendant for court at the preliminary hearing, then it is also not sufficient for establishing that a defendant is a sexually violent predator. As Muscari served as the only witness and did not provide any non-hearsay proof that the defendant was a sexually violent predator to support her conclusion, the Court determined that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence. Most importantly, the Court found that the doctor simply could not rely on hearsay evidence relating to unproven allegations. Had the doctor interviewed either the defendant or the complainant and learned firsthand of those claims, the doctor would have been in a position to decide whether or not to consider them. But here, the expert relied entirely on the hearsay contained in charging documents. Accordingly, the doctor’s opinion was not based on competent evidence, and the Court reversed the trial court’s decision.

Facing Criminal Charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also helped numerous clients obtain new trials and sentencing hearings on appeal. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.